Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge by Nichol, Gene R., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 61 | Number 5 Article 2
6-1-1983
Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court
and Valley Forge
Gene R. Nichol Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gene R. Nichol Jr., Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 798 (1983).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol61/iss5/2
STANDING ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE
SUPREME COURT AND VALLEY FORGE
GENE R. NICHOL, JR.t
Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the
United States to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies. " As a
component of this limitation, the Supreme Court has developed the doc-
trine of standing. A blend of constitutional and prudential considera-
tions, standing requires the plaintiffto demonstrate actual or threatened
injury caused by the defendant that can be redressed by a favorable
court decision. The necessityfor a litigant to suffer 'injury-in-fact" has
often prevented plaintffs who bring taxpayer or other public actions
from meeting standing requirements, thus rendering their claims unre-
viewable. In this article, Professor Nichol examines the propriety of
actions based directly upon broad-based constitutional guarantees.
This review reveals a confusing and inconsistent set of standing require-
ments often precluding review of generalized constitutional claims.
Noting that the injury-in-fact standing requirement renders shared con-
stitutional claims unenforceable merely because they are shared, Pro-
fessor Nichol suggests a method of article IIIjurisprudence that would
preserve the rightsflowingfrom collective constitutional guarantees.
John Marshall's classic opinion in Marbury v. MadisonI is, no doubt,
"vulnerable."'2 The power to review legislative and executive action is asserted
rather than deduced. Despite question begging by the great Chief Justice on
the ultimate issue of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, Mar-
bury still teaches much concerning the appropriate role of the federal judiciary
in our system of government. The sources of authority set forth in the opinion
purportedly mark the outer boundaries of our present judicial framework.
Yet, at times, the opinion's strains appear at odds and its modem-day
messages collide. Marshall, of course, based the power of judicial review on
the judiciary's duty to decide cases. The Constitution is law, and statutes are
law; but if the two conffict, the "courts must decide on the operation of each." 3
"Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule.' 4 By tying judicial review to the Court's obligation to ap-
ply all of the law-including the Constitution-when deciding traditionally
recognized cases,5 Marbury foreshadowed a huge and inordinately complex
t Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B.A. 1973, Oklahoma State Uni-
versity; J.D. 1976, University of Texas.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCI 2-12 (1962); Van Alstyne, ,4 Crical
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1.
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
4. Id.
5. Professor Bickel argued that the "case" limitation is not inherent in judicial review.
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body ofjurisprudence under the rubric of the article III "case or controversy" 6
requirement. Accordingly, we now accept that a plaintiff must have "stand-
ing' 7 to seek judicial relief. Related doctrines demand that the litigant's dis-
pute be "ripe' 8 and that his injury not be "moot." 9 Federal courts are also
understood to be without power to issue "advisory opinions"' 0 on the constitu-
tionality of government action. These limitations flow readily from the
"power to which Marshall laid claim."I
Marbury, however, suggests other bases for judicial authority as well.
Echoing Alexander Hamilton's claim that judicial review would keep the leg-
islature "within the limits assigned to their authority,"' 12 Marshall character-
ized the Supreme Court as the guardian of the written Constitution. "To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed
to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained?"' 3 The opinion also reflects a belief in special judicial competence
to interpret the Constitution: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."' 14
The growth in the availability of consititutional rights and remedies that
has occurred over the past twenty years, however, has demonstrated that the
judicial roles of "bulwark"' 5 against usurpation and "supreme"'16 expositor of
the Constitution cannot always be easily confined within the traditional con-
crete "case." Repeatedly, actions in which no cognizable injury distinct from
violation of the Constitution has been alleged have been presented to the
Supreme Court. Some of these cases eventually have been determined on the
merits, 17 while others have been dismissed for lack of standing.' 8 These pub-
Rather, it merely constitutes a necessary support for Marshall's argument for establishing such
review. A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 114-15.
6. Article III provides in pertinent part: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
7. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
8. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
9. Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
10. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911). See also Frankfurter, Note on Advi-
sory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1002 (1924).
11. A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 188. Professor Bickel's full quotation reads, however: "The
power to which Marshall laid claim is not the full measure of the Court's authority in our day."
Id. The expansion of the role of the judiciary beyond the private rights model contemplated in
Afarbury is explored more fully in section II B-2, infra.
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 492 (A. Hamilton) (B. F. Wright ed. 1961).
13. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 176.
14. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
15. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
16. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
17. See, eg., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947);
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559 (1911); Wilson v. Shaw, 204
U.S. 24 (1907); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
18. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
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lic actions, through which plaintiffs effectively seek to force their government
to toe the constitutional mark, have been characterized variously as "citizen"
suits,19 "taxpayer" suits,20 and actions by "private attorneys general." 2' In
such cases, plaintiffs cannot typically point to particularized harm that sepa-
rates them from the populace at large. As a result, the Supreme Court has
often labeled the claims mere "generalized grievances" 22 and therefore be-
yond the private rights theory of judicial review set forth in Marbury.
In reality, however, the law of standing to litigate does not represent the
bright line between private and public rights that a Marbury model might sug-
gest. Citizen standing to compel compliance with a variety of "minor" consti-
tutional mandates has been rejected.23 Yet more "important" clauses have
been held to provide a basis for standing despite the "plainly undifferenti-
ated" 24 nature of the plaintiffs claims.25
These divergent results can hardly be explained by the litigant's "personal
stake" in the controversy-the alleged measuring rod of standing to sue.2 6
Rather, they seem to reflect the influence of Marbury's alternative bases for
judicial authority. The prospect that some first and fourteenth amendment
limitations might be "passed by those intended to be restrained" 27 has, on
occasion, proven to be too much for the judicial mind to countenance-despite
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Ex parte L6vitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per
curiam); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
19. The citizen suit, used here in the constitutional context, refers to an action in which the
plaintiff claims no traditionally recognized injury-in-fact. Rather, standing is asserted on the basis
of a citizen's interest in assuring that his government complies with the Constitution. Professor
Jaffe has used both the term "citizen suit" and "public action" to refer to such cases. See Jaffe,
The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plainti, 116 U. PA.
L. REv. 1033 (1968).
20. Taxpayer standing similiarly is based upon less than traditional injury in fact. The tax-
payer, as a financial supporter of the government, asserts an interest in assuring that governmental
expenditures comply with the Constitution. Since even a successful challenge to a governmental
expenditure in this age is extremely unlikely to affect the taxpayer's bill, any previously perceived
difference between citizen and taxpayer status has blurred. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHt. L. REv. 601 (1968).
21. The term was coined by Judge Jerome Frank in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694
(2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943), and has been used primarily to describe statutory
causes of action in which the plaintiff represents the public rather than private interests. See also
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942). For further discussion, see infra section
II-C-I.
22. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974). See also Schlesinger v. Reserv-
ists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974); Exparte lUvitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)
(per curiam).
23. In Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 6.33 (1937) (per curiam), citizefi standing was denied to en-
force article I, § 6, clause 2. A similiar result under a different provision of the same clause was
achieved in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). In United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), plaintiffs were denied standing to enforce the article I,
§ 9 requirement that a "regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
Public Money shall be published from time to time."
24. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974).
25. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (establishment clause); Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455 (1973) (equal protection clause); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (equal protection
clause).
26. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
27. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 176.
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the absence of particularized harm.28 Further, the perceived special compe-
tence of the judiciary "to say what the law is,"' 2 9 especially when combined
with the "settled expectations"30 of the citizenry to look to the federal courts
for final resolution of constitutional disputes, has encouraged the Supreme
Court to reach the merits of certain claims even when a traditional plaintiff
has been lacking.3 1
One result of these confficting interests has been the development of an
inconsistent patchwork of standing rules to govern the presentation of public
actions. Taxpayer cases and citizen cases are measured by different standards.
Statutory citizen suits and constitutional citizen suits are gauged by rules that
are entirely dissimilar. The standards used to distinguish between various
types of plaintiffs have little, if anything, to do with the litigant's interest in the
dispute. It is thus apparent that the standing doctrine, which purports to ex-
amine whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring the lawsuit,3 2 is a par-
ticularly poor vehicle by which to decide what sorts of public actions will be
given judicial cognizance.
It was against this already unsatisfactory background that the United
States Supreme Court decided Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United/or Separation of Church and State.33 In Valley Forge a group of tax-
payer/citizens was denied standing to mount an establishment clause chal-
lenge to the transfer of surplus government property to a religious
organization.3 4 By reading its prior taxpayer cases in an unduly literal fashion
and by claiming to eschew constitutional citizen standing entirely,3 5 the Court
managed to render the law of standing even more arbitrary and incomprehen-
sible than it had been prior to the decision.
If nothing more, the Valley Forge decision should serve to reopen the
once vigorous debate3 6 over the propriety of taxpayer and citizen standing in
28. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
29. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177.
30. A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 14.
31. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
32. Id. at 99.
33. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
34. Id. at 468-70.
35. See id at 477-86.
36. The high point of scholarly debate on the issue of standing to pursue "public actions"
occurred almost concurrently with the Court's decision in Rast. The contributions of Professors
Jaffe and Davis, no doubt, represent a benchmark in legal scholarship on case or controversy
requirements. See generally K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 22.01-.18 (1958 &
Supp. 1970); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459-500 (1965); Davis,
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601 (1968); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 633 (1971); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in PublicActions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideolog-
icalPlaintfl, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
Of more recent vintage, see J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC
LAW (1978); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531 (1975); Albert, Justiciability and Theories of Judicial Review: .4 Remote Relationship, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1139 (1977); Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common
Law Method, 57 B.U.L. REV. 807 (1977); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence ofArticle III- Perspectives
on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L: REV. 297 (1979); Monaghan, Constitu-
tionalAdjudication" The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973); Parker & Stone, Standing and
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public actions. For well over a decade, the standing doctrine has been tied to a
purported constitutional requirement of injury-in-fact. 37 More recently, arti-
cle III has been described as requiring harm that is particularized, an injury
that separates the plaintiff from the populace as a whole.38
Therefore, when a litigant seeks to sue on the basis of a constitutional
injury that may well be shared with every other person in the United States,
the standing inquiry becomes complex. If, for example, the government lends
support to a religious organization or fails to comply with constitutionally
mandated disclosure requirements, plaintiffs sustaining traditional "injury"
may be lacking. Marbury's primary theory of review, based purely upon the
assertion of private rights, provides little support for judicial review in these
contexts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to countenance
such suits, whether under the rubric of taxpayer or citizen standing.
Yet, in a variety of circumstances, the Supreme Court has recognized that
"rights" can be created either by statutes or by the Constitution. The judiciary
regularly allows standing to assert the public interest when granted by stat-
ute--even without the existence of a traditionally recognized private injury.3 9
The Court has also readily recognized actions based directly upon the Consti-
tution when the particularized harm is clear, such as individualized violations
of the fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures or violations of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protec-
tion of the laws.4° If standing is to be denied because of the absence of partic-
ularized harm, shared constitutional rights become unenforceable merely
because they are shared. This result runs contrary to the Court's often re-
peated refrain that "standing is not to be denied merely because many people
suffer the same injury."41 Thus, it is clear that the constitutional validity of
citizen and taxpayer actions implicates troubling contradictions in the juris-
prudence of article III. Those contradictions go to the very essence of the role
of the federal judiciary.
With the Valley Forge decision as a backdrop, this article examines the
propriety of citizen, taxpayer, and other public actions grounded directly upon
broad-based constitutional guarantees. Part I will review the work of the
Public Law Remedies, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 771 (1978); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A
Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REV. 645 (1973); Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An
Analysis and Some Proposalsfor Legislative Reform, 30 RUtrERs L. REV. 863 (1977); Tushnet,
The New Law of Standing: . Plea/or 4bandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977); Tushnet,
The Sociology of Article III. A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980).
37. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 450 (1970).
38. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
39. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1972).
40. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Pierce v: Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See
also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
41. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687
(1973). Accord Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976); Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
[Vol. 61
STANDING AND VALLEY FORGE
Supreme Court dating from its first major taxpayer decision in F rothingham v.
Mellon,4 2 to its most recent effort in Valley Forge. The cases reveal no coher-
ent theory of judicial review, but instead a confusing and inconsistent set of
standards that generally result in the conclusory ouster of federal plaintiffs.
Although the judicial reaction to generalized constitutional claims has
been a studied hesitancy to grant standing, the door has not been completely
closed. The current state of the law countenances standing to present some
generalized challenges, but not others. The result is the existence of a hierar-
chy of constitutional values that the Court has not only failed to explain, but
which, if we are to take the Justices at their word, has no place in article III
jurisprudence.43 Accordingly, it would seem that a reconsideration, even if
not soon to be expected by the Court, is in order.
44
In Part II, the private rights theory upon which Valley Forge is apparently
based will be examined. A number of alternative approaches suggested by
individual Justices and commentators will be reviewed in Part III. The article
concludes by proposing a method for determining standing to sue in cases in
which the "rights" asserted flow from constitutional guarantees and the "inju-
ries" sustained are shared by the populace at large.
I. STANDING TO SUE AS CITIZEN OR TAXPAYER
Though hardly plowing new ground, any consideration of the propriety
of the Valley Forge decision must begin with a review of what has gone before.
Prior to examining the particulars of the case, therefore, a brief description of
the Court's track record in public actions is appropriate.
A. The Major Decisions
When in 1923 Justice Sutherland wrote for the Court in Frothingham v.
Mellon,4- he declared that the "right of a taxpayer to enjoin the execution of a
federal appropriation act, on the ground that it is invalid and will result in
taxation for illegal purposes, has never been passed upon by this court."46
Technically that was true. In the preceeding twenty-five years, however, the
42. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
43. Justice Rehnquist declared for the majority in Valley Forge: "Moreover, we know of no
principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary 'slid-
ing scale' of standing which might permit respondents to invoke the judicial power of the United
States." 454 U.S. at 484 (footnote omitted). Such a strong position is surprising given the Court's
decisions in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); and Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
44. The Valley Forge decision probably indicates that the only "reconsideration" of the citi-
zen and taxpayer rules the present Court is willing to countenance would be overruling Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). As discussed below in section II-C, however, even doing away with
that remnant of the overt public action would leave the citizen standing principle confused, given
such cases as Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Valley Forge does lead one to predict, however, that the United States Supreme Court is hardly
open to the idea of public constitutional actions.
45. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
46. Id. at 486.
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Court had several times assumed that taxpayers or citizens had standing to
challenge congressional or executive actions in cases in which the plaintiffs'
claims were ultimately denied on the merits.47 Further, standing had been
expressly granted in various cases challenging state and local conduct without
specific concern for whether it was based upon citizen, taxpayer, or any other
status.48 In Frothingham, however, the Court directly addressed the propriety
of taxpayer status as the basis for standing to contest the constitutionality of a
federal expenditure.
Frothingham represented a challenge by both the State of Massachusetts
and a taxpayer to a federal spending program designed to reduce infant mor-
tality.49 Mrs. Frothingham claimed that the Maternity Act in question oper-
ated to take her property, under the guise of taxation, "without due process of
law." 50 Justice Sutherland, although expressing approval of federal cases al-
lowing taxpayers to sue a municipality, declared that the interest of a federal
taxpayer was "minute and indeterminable,"'' t and as a result, an inappropriate
basis for standing. Not only would the acceptance of taxpayer standing result
in the "attendant inconveniences" of a multitude of suits,52 but it would thrust
the judiciary into a "position of authority over the government" that it did not
possess. 53
The door to the federal courthouse was similarly closed to citizens' suits
in Exparte Lvit.54 In Lbvitt the plaintiff, suing as a "citizen and member of
47. In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), a citizen and taxpayer suit, a resident of the
District of Columbia sued the Treasurer of the United States to stop the payment of federal funds
to a Catholic hospital located in the nation's capital. The Court upheld the spending program on
the merits, "[p]assin, the various objections" to the parties' maintenance of the suit. Id. at 295,
300. Similarly, in Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906), the Court assumed that a taxpayer had
standing to claim that a revenue bill must originate in the House of Representatives. Id at 438.
Again, in Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907), the Court noted the possible lack of a sufficient
"pecuniary interest" in a citizen suit filed to challenge the construction of the Panama Canal, but
proceeded to adjudicate the merits and ultimately upheld the federal action. Id. at 31, 35.
48. In Crampton v. Zabriski, 101 U.S. 601, 609 (1879), a New Jersey taxpayer was granted
standing to challenge a local, rather than federal, program. That decision was cited with approval
in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923). The Supreme Court upheld Oklahoma's
decision to move its capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma City against a challenge by "taxpayers and
citizens" in Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 563 (1911). Standing was apparently based upon an
Oklahoma statute giving its state supreme court "original jurisdiction" to entertain any proceeding
to determine the legality of the removal of the capital. Id. Nine years later, in Hawke v. Smith,
253 U.S. 221 (1920), the Court invalidated the process used in Ohio to ratify the eighteenth
amendment. The action was filed by an Ohio taxpayer seeking to enjoin the Ohio Secretary of
State from "spending the public money in preparing and printing forms of ballot for submission
of a referendum to the electors. ... Id. at 224.
49. Massachusetts claimed that the Maternity Act in question violated sovereign rights pro-
tected by the tenth amendment. Ultimately, the Court held that the state's claim was plainly
"political, and not judicial in character." 262 U.S. at 483. Although reported in a single opinion,
the two cases are often referred to separately, with the taxpayer action labeled Frothingham v.
Mellon and the suit filed by the state entitled Massachusetts v. Mellon.
50. 262 U.S. at 486. In essence, however, Mrs. Frothingham's challenge was also based upon
the tenth amendment. See id at 479.
51. .d. at 487.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 489.
54. 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam).
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the bar" of the Supreme Court, 5 was denied .standing to contest the appoint-
ment of Justice Black as contrary to article I, section 6 of the Constitution.
56
Describing mere citizen status as "insufficient" to support standing, the Court
indicated that a plaintiff "must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public."57 Although it was unclear whether the prohibition against taxpayer
and citizen suits was mandated by article III, by 1950 Justice Frankfurter ar-
gued in his noted concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath58 that "[a] litigant must show more than that 'he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally."' 59 Over the next two de-
cades, however, these seemingly absolute prohibitions would be loosened
considerably.
The barrier against taxpayer suits began to be whittled away as early as
the Court's decision in Everson v. Board of Education,60 in which a taxpayer
sued to challenge expenditures by a local school board for the transportation
of students to Catholic schools. The Court reached the merits of the establish-
ment clause claim without discussing the standing issue. 61 Five years later,
however, a New Jersey taxpayer was denied standing to contest required read-
ing of the Old Testament in public schools in Doremus v. Board of Educa-
tion.62 In Doremus the Court described a "direct dollar-and-cents injury" as
the requisite to any taxpayer claim.63 Since Bible reading did not result in a
particular appropriation or expenditure, plaintiffs claim was characterized as
merely "a religious difference." 64
Taxpayer standing was expanded, and the strains of both Everson and
Doremus preserved, in Flast v. Cohen.65 Faced with a first amendment chal-
lenge to the use of federal funds to support instructional activities and materi-
als in religious schools, the Court in Flast for the first time unequivocably
recognized taxpayer status, without more, as a basis for standing. Sweeping
aside any claimed article III barrier to taxpayer standing, Chief Justice War-
ren's opinion established a two-pronged test allegedly designed to determine
whether a sufficient "nexus" could be demonstrated between the plaintiff's sta-
55. Id. at 634.
56. Id. at 634. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, provides as follows: "No Senator or Representa-
tive shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the
authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall
have been encreased during such time."
57. 302 U.S. at 634.
58. 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
59. Id at 151 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 447).
60. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
61. See id at 4-7.
62. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
63. Id. at 434.
64. Id.
65. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Arguably, 17art preserved the theories of both Everson and Doremus
since taxpayer standing was granted only to contest expenditures.
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tus as a taxpayer and the constitutional violation claimed. 6 Accordingly,
plaintiff was required to allege that the statute challenged was an exercise of
the spending power6 7 and that the expenditure violated a specific constitu-
tional limitation.68 Since the plaintiff in Flast contested a federal spending
program, and since the establishment clause was deemed to be a specific rather
than general limitation, standing was granted.69 Determination of the exact
parameters of the ruling was left for future cases. 70
Although the Burger Court has been willing to apply the Flast test by its
terms,7 1 and has followed the local taxpayer exception recognized in both
Frothingham and Fast,72 its reception of taxpayer standing has been less than
warm. In United States v. Richardson73 plaintiff challenged the accounting
procedures of the Central Intelligence Agency under the article I, section 9
requirement that a statement of expenditures for "all Public Money . . . be
published from time to time." 74 Chief Justice Burger's opinion stated that the
allegations of the plaintiff fell "far. . . short of the. . . criteria of Flast."7
The action was characterized as an attack on the statutes governing CIA ac-
counting rather than a spending challenge; the Court apparently regarded the
article I, section 9 accounting requirement as something other than a "specific
constitutional limitation upon. . . spending." 76
The complaint in Richardson, if not viewed as a challenge to a spending
program, could rationally have been seen as a necessary requisite to a spend-
ing challenge. It would be difficult to attack CIA expenditures without first
discovering what they were.77 The allegations could also have been read as a
claim that the entire CIA budget was appropriated illegally, given the disclo-
sure requirements of article I, section 9. Finally, the conclusory determination
that the provision was not a specific limitation on federal spending was baf-
fling since it could easily have been seen as more specific than the establish-
ment clause guarantee that the Court found specific enough in Flast. Thus,
Richardson suggested that the door opened in Flast was viewed with disfavor.
By the time Valley Forge was decided, that disfavor apparently had turned to
hostility.
In comparison with the Court's treatment of the taxpayer suit, the devel-
66. Id at 102-03.
67. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
68. 392 U.S. at 102-03.
69. 1d. at 105.
70. Id
71. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (plurality opinion) (test implicitly
followed).
72. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (exception implicitly followed).
73. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
75. 418 U.S. at 174.
76. d. at 175 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 104); see id at 173 (party must plead
specific constitutional limitation).
77. The Third Circuit treated the case in precisely that way, asking: "[H]ow can a taxpayer
make that challenge unless he knows how the money is being spent?" Richardson v. United
States, 465 F.2d 844, 853 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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opment of the citizen suit has been both more simple and more complex. The
apparently absolute bar to such actions espoused in Ex parte Livitt was ex-
pressly retained in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,78 in
which citizens were denied standing to raise a claim that the incompatability
clause79 prevents a member of Congress from simultaneously holding a com-
mission in the Armed Forces Reserve.80 Fashioning a rule in direct contradic-
tion to Flast, Chief Justice Burger declared that "standing to sue may not be
predicated upon an interest. . . held in common by all members of the public,
because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share."8'
Despite the strong language of Reservists Committee, the law of standing
has evolved to encompass a variety of injuries that are both generalized and
abstract. The apportionment cases, for example, are constructed upon a "fic-
tion" of injury related to vote dilution that is abstract and indefinable.82 Ac-
cordingly, Justice Frankfurter claimed in dissent in Baker v. Carr that the
plaintiffs argued no more than that "the frame of government is askew."83
Similarly, standing has been achieved in school prayer cases despite the ab-
sence of individual injury.84 Both lines of cases, though cast in the mode of
particularized harm,8 5 approach grants of citizen standing merely to enforce
governmental compliance with the Constitution. Further, in nonconstitutional
cases an assortment of relatively abstract injuries have been accepted to sup-
port standing.8 6 In actions based upon standing granted by statute, plaintiffs
have even been allowed to sue as representatives of the public interest-by
definition an interest common to all.8 7
B. Valley Forge-Limiting the Public Action
Against this somewhat checkered framework, a group of taxpay-
ers/citizens was denied standing to challenge the transfer of a valuable parcel
of government property to a religious organization in Valley Forge Christian
78. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
79. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. For its text, see supra note 56.
80. 418 U.S. at 220-21.
81. Id. at 221.
82. Jaffe, supra note 19, at 1046 n.45; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
83. 369 U.S. 186, 299 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
84. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963).
85. The complexities involved in defining particularized injury--as opposed to generalized
grievance-are explored fully in section I-C below.
86. Aesthetic and environmental interests have regularly provided the requisite basis for
standing. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S:669
(1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S 205 (1972), in which the Supreme Court recognized the loss of "inportant benefits
from interracial associations" as an adequate demonstration of injury-in-fact. Id. at 209-10.
87. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 164 n.15 (1978) (plaintifls had standing under the
Endangered Species Act, which allows "any person" to bring an action in federal court to enforce
the Act); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940) (holding explicitly that
plaintiff who had no legal interest nevertheless could be a proper party if he met the terms of the
statute). See also Jaffe, Standing Again, supra note 36, at 635 (discussing Sanders Bros. Radio
Station).
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College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church & State.88 In 1976, pur-
suant to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act,89 the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) transferred a seventy-seven
acre tract, which included a "surplus" Army hospital, to Valley Forge Chris-
tian College. The Christian College, operated under the auspices of the As-
sembly of God, was instituted "to offer systematic training on the collegiate
level to men and women for Christian service as either ministers or laymen."
90
The Act authorized HEW to grant a "public benefits allowance" to tax
exempt institutions to offset the price of the property "on the basis of benefits
from the use of such property for educational purposes." 9' The appraised
value of the hospital compound at the time of the transfer was over $500,000.
Because of HEW's computed 100% public benefit allowance, however, the
Christian College was permitted to acquire the facility without making any
payment whatsoever. The resulting purchase was conditioned upon the Chris-
tian College's promise to use the property for thirty years solely for educa-
-tional purposes.
Three months after the transfer, Americans United for Separation of
Church and State (Americans United) brought suit to challenge the convey-
ance under the establishment clause. The trial court dismissed the complaint,
finding that plaintiffs lacked standing underFIast.92 The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed.93 Despite its agreement with the trial court that "it
may well be that the plaintiffs here lack taxpayer standing,"' 94 the majority of
the court of appeals found that Americans United had standing as "citizens"
claiming "injury in fact to their. . . right to a government that 'shall make no
law respecting the establishment of religion.' ,, By a bare majority,96 the
United States Supreme Court reversed, denying both taxpayer and citizen
standing.
97
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist first determined that plaintiffs
had failed to meet the test for taxpayer standing set forth in Flast. In short, the
claim ran afoul of the first prong of the nexus test since plaintiffs challenged a
decision by HEW to transfer a parcel of federal property rather than an exer-
cise of the congressional spending power.98 The majority reasoned that a rig-
orous, if not unduly literal, reading of the Fast test was mandated by the
88. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
89. 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-535 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
90. 454 U.S. at 468.
91. Id at 467 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 12.9(a) (1980)).
92. I1d at 469.
93. Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. HEW, 619 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.
1980), rev'd sub nom Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
94. Id. at 260 (emphasis original).
95. Id. at 261.
96. Justice Brennan dissented in Valley Forge, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun.
454 U.S. at 490. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent. Id at 513.
97. .d at 490.
98. Id at 479.
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Court's decisions in Richardson and Reservists Committee.99 As a result,
Americans United were "plainly without standing to sue as taxpayers."' °
The claim of citizen standing was treated even more bluntly. Accusing
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals of ignoring "unambiguous limitations" on
citizen standing, Justice Rehnquist declared that such actions based directly on
the Bill of Rights have "no place in our constitutional scheme." 10 ' The lower
court's conclusion that the first amendment created a "personal constitutional
right" 10 2 to separation of church and state was nothing more than the asser-
tion of a right to a particular kind of government conduct-the sort of genera-
lized grievance prohibited by article 111.103 Despite Flast, the Court indicated
that there is "no principled basis" on which to base a "hierarchy of constitu-
tional values" allowing special status to sue under the establishment clause. 104
Finally, the Court relied on Reservists Committee for the proposition that there
are "no boundaries" to any standing theory based merely upon the position of
citizens as the ultimate beneficiaries of various constitutional provisions. 05
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
C. Taxpayer and Citizen Standing After Valley Forge: Rules and
Anomalies
Article III standing, cast in its most general terms, requires that a litigant
allege "distinct and palpable injury"'1 6 that is "fairly traceable" to the acts of
the defendant 10 7 and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. 10 8 Al-
though injury has been defined very broadly in a number of contexts, 10 9 Rich-
ardson, Reservists Committee, and Valley Forge teach quite clearly that
standing cannot be predicated merely upon the "harm" a citizen sustains as
the result of the government's failure to comply with the Constitution." 0
Therefore, under present article III guidelines, the ideological non-
99. Id. at 481.
100. Id. at 482.
101. Id. at 489.
102. Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 265 (3d Cir.
1980), rep'd sub noim Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
103. 454 U.S. at 483.
104. Id. at 484.
105. Id. at 485.
106. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Accord Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).
107. Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 161 (1981) (quoting Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977)).
108. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,38 (1976); see also Nichol, Causa-
lion asa Standing Requirement- The Unprincipled Use of JudicialRestraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185 (1981).
109. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347,353 (1979) (environmental harms); Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (same); Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (harm to "benefits of interracial associations").
110. Of course, government action that allegedly violates the Constitution in a manner partic-
ularized to the plaintiff can constitute "injury" for purposes of article III. See, e.g., Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 519 (1925).
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HohfeldianIII citizen or taxpayer, if not the beneficiary of a statutory grant of
standing," 12 may not sue in federal court unless he meets the Flast test. That
test, together with the resulting standing prohibition for ideological litigants
who fail to meet its terms, provides a less than satisfactory response to the
difficult problems raised by citizen standing.
1. The Flast Nexus Test
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Flast v. Cohen 13 purported to reject
the separation of powers basis of Frothingham v. Mellon "14 and described the
focal point of the standing inquiry as "whether the Party invoking federal
court jurisdiction has 'a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy'
sufficient to invoke relief." 15 Under the test announced in Fast, a taxpayer is
deemed to have the sufficient "personal stake in the outcome" only if there is a
"logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudi-
cated.'1 6 The requisite nexus is measured by a two-pronged test. First, the
taxpayer must establish that the action challenged involves an exercise of con-
gressional power under the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution,
article I, section 8. Second, the litigant must allege that the challenged con-
duct violates specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of
the taxing and spending power. lI"
The initial query the Fast holding raises is that posed by Professor Bick-
el: "what in the world does it mean?"' "18 Lower federal courts have struggled
with the question whether federal expenditures that are supported not only by
the taxing and spending clause but also by some independent constitutional
source of power fall under Fast's first prong. If not, as most have indi-
cated, 119 one wonders if a congressional funding program to support religion
I 11. As Justice Harlan indicated in dissent in Flast v. Cohen, a Hohfeldian plaintiff is one who
has the "personal and proprietary interest of the traditional plaintiff, and [not] the representative
and public interests of the plaintiff in a public action." 392 U.S. 83, 119 n.5 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasonings,
23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); Jaffe, supra note 19.
112. In TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), for example, the Supreme Court had no trouble
recognizing standing under the terms of the Endangered Species Act that allow "any person" to
sue in federal court. Id at 164 n.15.
113. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
114. 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 42-53).
115. 392 U.S. at 101 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
116. Id. at 102.
117. Id.
118. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 64 (1970).
119. The Flat opinion declared that "incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administra-
tion of an essentially regulatory statute" could not be challenged by a taxpayer. 392 U.S. at 102.
In Richardson v. Kennedy, 313 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Pa. 1970), for example, a three-judge court
determined that a challenge to the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967 was not a
spending challenge. The court found that the congressional pay raises in question were supported
not only by the taxing and spending clause but also by the provision in article I, § 6 that "Senators
and Representatives shall receive a Compensation .... " Id at 1286. Of course, plaintiffs had
alleged that the procedure for granting pay raises did not comply with article I, § 6. Similiarly, in
Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), the Tenth Circuit dismissed a taxpayer challenge
to Vietnam War expenditures because such funds were not spent pursuant to the taxing and
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in order to promote commerce would be nonreviewable. Nor has the Court
successfully explained why the establishment clause-but no other provision
of the Constitution-is sufficiently "specific" to justify taxpayer standing. 120
However difficult it may be to determine exactly what the Flast test was
designed to encompass, that inquiry pales in comparison to the effort required
to discover any relationship that exists between the "nexus" standard and the
plaintiffs "personal stake" in the lawsuit. Taxpayer cases do not contest taxes.
Standing would be a simple matter if they did, for taxpayers have consistently
been held to have standing to contest the constitutionality of taxes specifically
levied against them. 121 Rather, taxpayer cases contest expenditures. Accord-
ingly, it is difficult to see how the status of being a taxpayer increases one's
interest in the litigation. Certainly the plaintiffs in Fast had no expectation
that their bills would be reduced, nor was such a reduction even contemplated
by the Court's standing analysis. In fact, since a primary argument for public
aid to parochial schools is tax savings, it was perhaps more reasonable for the
Flast plaintiffs to expect that their tax burden would be increased if they pre-
vailed.' 22 Of course, that gave the F/ast plaintiffs little reason to hesitate since
they obviously sued as separationists rather than as taxpayers. 123
Regardless of whether tax subsidies to parochial schools increase or de-
crease the public fisc, it is virtually certain that federal funds allocated to any
program challenged by a taxpayer will simply be diverted to a constitutionally
"safe" purpose if the litigant prevails. Accordingly, any claim of financial in-
terest by the taxpayer is negligible. 124 The absence of any relationship be-
spending clause, but were supported by the power of Congress to raise an army under article I,§ 8, clauses 12 and 13. Id. at 239.
120. Elast preserved the decision in Frothingham v. Mellon by characterizing that taxpayer
challenge, which was based upon the due process clause and the tenth amendment, as a general
challenge. 392 U.S. at 104-05. The specific disclosure provisions of article I, § 9, which easily
could be seen as an effective declaration that federal funds cannot be spent absent regular state-
ments of account, were deemed general in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176 (1974).
The circuit courts tended to characterize the congressional power to declare war under article I,
§ 8, clause I 1 as general. See Pietsch v. President of the United States, 434 F.2d 861, 863 (2d Cir.
1970); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 263, 239 (10th Cir. 1969). Justices Brennan and Douglas, how-
ever, considered the same provision to be a specific limitation under the second prong of F/ast.
Sarnoff v. Shultz, 409 U.S. 929, 930 (1972) (Brennan & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 57-61 (1936).
122. See J. VINING, LEoAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 124 (1978).
Professor Vining argues that the "Court could not honestly say to the world that it was moved to
examine an act of Congress to save the challengers a dollar, and still talk of judicial economy,
nonprejudicial error, and harm de minlmii." Id. at 124.
123. Consider the following excerpt from the appellants' brief filed in R/ast:
But the plaintiffs in the present suit and in similiar First Amendment suits are not watch-
dogs of the public treasury. They are not motivated by any desire to keep taxes down.
They sue, in the phraseology of Doremus, to prevent a pocketbook injury but only be-
cause that is part of what they deem a much graver injury, an injury to the right to live
under a government which separates itself strictly from the church and church affairs.
Brief for Appellant at 37, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
124. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 36, § 3531 ("the taxpayer is hard
ut to identify any substantial interest qua taxpayer rather than citizen"). See also L. JAFFm,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIVE AcTION 485 (1965); Bittker, The Case of the Fictitious
Taxpayer: The Federal Taxpayer's Suit Twenty Years After Flast v. Cohen, 36 U. CHI. L. REv.
364, 372 (1969) ("damages are never awarded to the plaintiff, and it is possible that Congress will
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tween the financial interests of a taxpayer and the constitutionality of
government expenditures is demonstrated by the consistent refusal of the fed-
eral courts to allow taxpayers to raise constitutional objections to expenditures
as a defense to tax collection actions.125
Since a taxpayer can make no realistic claim that he is litigating to keep
his taxes down, he is relegated to an assertion that his money is being spent in
violation of the Constitution-the same generalized complaint repeatedly re-
jected in the citizen cases. The status of taxpayer can thus be distinguished
from the status of citizen only if one is willing to accept the payment of taxes
as a sort of de facto admission charge for use of the federal courts to challenge
congressional expenditures. It would seem apparent, however, that such a the-
ory of taxpayer standing would suffer from the same defects of wealth discrim-
ination that proved fatal to the poll tax and to other financial limitations on
the exercise of civil liberties.' 26 As a result, there is no acceptable distinction
to be drawn between taxpayer status and the 'broader concept of citizen
standing.
Similarly, the two prongs of the nexus test are not directed at measuring
the plaintiffs personal stake. A taxpayer has no less an interest in challenging
allegedly unconstitutional expenditures that are incidental to a regulatory pro-
gram than would be the case with "pure" spending exercises. It is also unclear
how a litigant's personal stake varies depending upon whether the constitu-
tional guarantee under which he seeks relief is a specific or a general limitation
upon the spending power. A brief examination of two lower court decisions
demonstrates the curious results mandated by the "specific" prong of the Flast
test.
Shortly after Flast was decided, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit granted standing to a group of taxpayers in
Protestants & Other Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church & State v. Wat-
son. 127 Through an arguably incorrect reading of the Flast test, the court al-
lowed the taxpayers to challenge the issuance of a postage stamp
commemorating Christmas.' 28 In Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal,
however, the same court dismissed a taxpayer suit brought to challenge IRS
rulings that allowed oil company payments to foreign nations to constitute
spend 'his tax money' in other, unassailable programs if the one he attacks is held
unconstitutional").
125. See First v. Commissioner, 547 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), refusing to allow the
Firsts to assert a "war tax deduction" in order to protest the Vietnam War. Rejecting Professor
Sedler's arguments on behalf of the litigants, the court indicated: "There has been a long, undevi-
ating pattern of cases-all the way from the Tax Court to the United States Supreme Court-
holding against the Firsts on the ground that they have no standing to raise their religious and
other claims in avoidance of their legally imposed tax obligations." Id at 46. See also Autenrieth
v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970); Kalish v. United
States, 411 F.2d 606, 607 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Crowe v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 766, 767
(8th Cir. 1968); Swallow v. United States, 325 F.2d 97, 98 (10th Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
126. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956). See also Bittker, supra note 124, at 372.
127. 407 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
128. Id at 1265-66.
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United States tax credits. 129 The suit was not founded upon a specific consti-
tutional limitation.
It is difficult to understand how the printing of one postage stamp rather
than another, as in Protestants, hurts the taxpayer qua taxpayer. 130 In con-
trast, the plaintiffs in Tax Analysts specifically alleged that the contested IRS
rulings had cost the United States Treasury over three billion dollars in a sin-
gle year.' 3' Thus, the Flast test allows taxpayers to present certain cases-
primarily those in which the taxpayer interest is merely a cover for the plain-
tiffs' true motivation 132 -while denying the justiciability of what might more
appropriately be characterized as "true" taxpayer cases designed to achieve an
equitable allocation of the tax burden.
The only fair reading of the Flast test, therefore, is that it was a compro-
mise apparently meant to open the door to one type of generalized constitu-
tional claim while preserving the Frothingham bar to the rest. The theory of
Flast, however, is not so easily limited. Rather, in the words of the late Pro-
fessor Bickel "taxpayers invoking the Establishment Clause are not distiguish-
able, except by an arbitrary ipse dixit, from other taxpayers attacking federal
expenditures on other grounds .... ,,133
2. The Anomalies
On its face, the taxpayer standard announced in Flast provides the weak-
est foundation upon which to construct a law of standing governing the pres-
entation of public constitutional actions. The standing decisions handed down
over the past decade demonstrate that generalized constitutional claims will be
entertained only if the Supreme Court agrees that the Flast test has been met.
The grudging interpretations of the nexus test in Richardson and Valley Forge,
however, have served to render an already questionable standard little more
than ludicrous. The inconsistencies and anomalies created by the rule and its
literal applications now comprise the law of standing to present public consti-
tutional actions.
a. Property v. Money. Trashing Flast
The transfer contested in Valley Forge involved property that was initially
purchased with federal funds and that bore "the mark of ten million dollars in
federal improvements." 134 At the time of its transfer to the Christian College,
the property's fair market value was approximately $1.3 million. 135 Yet be-
cause the conduct challenged was merely the transfer of a valuable piece of
129. 566 F.2d 130, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
130. See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 72 (1975).
131. 566 F.2d at 134 n.10.
132. For a fuller discussion of the "fiction" of taxpayer standing and the undesirable results of
employing the fiction, see infra Section III-A.
133. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 76 (1970).
134. 454 U.S. at 512 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
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property rather than the expenditure of tax dollars, standing was denied. 136
One is hard pressed, no doubt, to discover a "constitutional difference"'137 be-
tween a cash grant to construct a building and the transfer of an existing facil-
ity. Apparently, however, standing now exists under Flast to contest a five
dollar appropriation to a religious sect. But if Congress were to appropriate
$5,000,000 to buy a building and a member of the executive branch decided to
give the building to his local church, the action would be nonreviewable.
James Madison would likely find that result curious-especially if dictated by
the standing doctrine. 138
The Court's determination that plaintiffs standing turned on whether the
transfer was an exercise of the spending power or the power to dispose of
tangible property reflects an obvious hostility to the holding of Flast. Further,
it curiously reflects a limitation only upon the legislative branch, and thus a
taxpayer's "personal stake" is limited solely to scrutinizing congressional ap-
propriations. As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, such a literal reading
of the taxpayer rules ultimately "trivialize[s] the standing doctrine."'13 9
Valley Forge is also flatly inconsistent with Tilton v. Richardson,140 in
which a group of citizens and taxpayers mounted a partially successful chal-
lenge to the administration of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963.
The statute had authorized a loan program for both public and sectarian col-
leges that was designed to encourage the construction of educational facilities.
Plaintiffs' broad-based attack on the statute as applied to sectarian schools was
denied on the merits. Largely because the loans were conditioned upon the
promise that the buildings would not be used for religious purposes, the Court
determined that the act had no "principal or primary effect" of advancing
religion.141
One provision of the Act, however, was deemed constitutionally defective.
The statute granted the federal government a remedy akin to recision for any
violation of the prohibition against religious use. 142 Under the terms of the
Act, however, the recision remedy was available to the federal government for
only twenty years. In striking down the twenty-year limititation, Chief Justice
Burger wrote for a plurality of the Court:
Limiting the prohibition for religious use of the structure to 20
years obviously opens the facility to use for any purpose at the end of
that period. It cannot be assumed that a substantial structure has no
value after that period and hence the unrestricted use of a valuable
136. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Valley Forge, determined that the source of
the complaint "is not a congressional action, but a decision by HEW to transfer a parcel of federal
property." Id at 479.
Accordingly, the conduct challenged was "not an exercise of authority conferred by the tax-
ing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8." Id. at 480.
137. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. See infra note 292.
139. 454 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
141. Id. at 679-80.
142. Id. at 682-83.
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property is in effect a contribution of some value to a religious body
.... If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, con-
verted into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests,
the original federal grant will in part have the effect of advancing
religion. 143
Had the Court in Tilton been as anxious to deny standing as it was in
Valley Forge, plaintiffs would have been barred from raising the constitution-
ality of the twenty year limitation. The limitation was held to violate the es-
tablishment clause because it failed to provide sufficient safeguard against the
possibility that the subsidized property would one day be used for religious
purposes. Any conversion or transfer of the property in the future, however,
arguably would not have been an expenditure under the Flast test since the
money, as in Valley Forge, would have long been spent. Plaintiffs would
merely have been asserting their desire for a particular type of government
behavior. Yet standing was never questioned by the Court in Tilton.
Regardless of its hypothetical outcome under the inhospitable nexus test
employed in Valley Forge, Tilton demonstrates that the establishment clause
prohibits governmental support of religion through the distribution of largesse
either in the form of money or property. It is ironic that when Judge Frankel
dissented from the three-judge determination to refuse standing at the trial
court level in Flast, he characterized as "frivolous" the possibility that "[t]he
First Amendment's commands, so sensitively and astutely enforced in their
essential substance under the decisions of the Supreme Court . . .could be
avoided by details of government bookkeeping .. ."144 The decision in Val-
ley Forge allows the constitutional standing determination to turn on precisely
such details.
b. Local v. Federal Taxpayers
Unfortunately, the money/property rationale is not the only peculiar as-
pect of the law of standing to bring a public constitutional action. The interest
of a taxpayer of a municipality in the use of its funds has consistently been
characterized as "direct and immediate" and, without more, an appropiate ba-
sis for standing.145 The federal courts have also granted taxpayers standing to
sue a variety of state and local agencies despite the apparent failure of the suits
to come within the terms of the Flast test. 146 This "local" exception to the
taxpayer standing rules can hardly withstand scrutiny.
First, as several commentators have pointed out, the "personal stake" that
many huge corporations have in federal tax revenues is far larger proportion-
143. Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
144. Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Frankel, J., dissenting).
145. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923); accord Crampton v. Zabrisskie,
101 U.S. 601, 609 (1879).
146. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (taxpayer suit against state agency);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (suit against local school board); Public Funds for
Pub. Schools of N.J. v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979) (action against state officials); Ramsey
v. Chaco, 549 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1977) (suit against Guam territorial officials).
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ally than the tiny fractions contributed by ordinary taxpayers to giant munici-
palities.147 No doubt the impact upon the average municipal resident's tax bill
of any successful challenge to a local expenditure is "both speculative and
minute."'148 Second, the different treatment of local and federal taxpayers
reveals quite clearly the separation of powers basis of the Court's taxpayer
standing rules. Somehow it is more constitutionally vexing to allow taxpayers
to challenge congressional programs than those of their state counterparts.
Yet Flast characterized separation of powers concerns as irrelevent in a stand-
ing inquiry that focuses upon the personal stake of the plaintiff.149
Finally, the "local" exception creates an ample irony in the enforceability
of the Bill of Rights. Under present article III analysis, it appears that tax-
payer standing would have been upheld if a state agency, rather than HEW,
had carried out the actions challenged in Valley Forge.150 The first amend-
ment, however, indicates that "Congress shall make no law. . . ." It was, of
course, only through a complex and strained interpretation that many provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights were made enforceable against the states.1 51 Any
local exception to the taxpayer standing rules, therefore, is not only a "crown-
ing paradox,"' 52 but it also turns the language of the Constitution on its head.
c. Constitutional v. Statutory Rights
The decisions in Richardson, Reservists Committee, and Valley Forge,
which counsel that constitutional "rights" shared in common by the citizenry
cannot provide the basis for standing, are surprising when compared with ju-
dicial treatment of broad statutory rights. In Richardson, for example, plain-
tiffs were denied standing to seek the compelled disclosure of the CIA budget
under article I, section 9, clause 7.153 It must be assumed that article I, section
9 does not create judicially cognizable "rights" because such interests are
"generalized." Had plaintiffs been able to pursue an analogous cause of action
under the Freedom of Information Act, however, standing would have been
assured despite the generalized nature of the claim.154
Similarly, plaintiffs in Reservists Committee complained essentially of a
congressional conffict of interest in violation of article I, section 6. Because the
147. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 36, § 3531, at 178; Hearings on
S. 2097 Before the Subcomm on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 493 (1966) (letter from K.C. Davis to Senator Sam Ervin).
148. L. JAFE, supra note 36, at 485.
149. 392 U.S. at 100.
150. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (resident taxpayers allowed to challenge loans
and transfers to parochial schools by a state agency).
151. See Adanson v. California, 322 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticutt, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
152. Professor Jaffe argued that it is a "crowning paradox that the constitutionality of state
and local expenditures can be adjudicated by the Supreme Court but not the constitutionality of
federal expenditures." L. JAFFE, supra note 124, at 459-60.
153. 418 U.S. at 167-70.
154. Standing to contest the denial of a statutory freedom of information request is given to
any person. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 204-05 (1974)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79, 92 (1973).
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claim was one "shared by all citizens," standing was denied i5 -5 Curiously,
Chief Justice Burger explained: "We have no doubt that if the Congress en-
acted a statute creating such a legal right, the requisite injury for standing
would be found in an invasion of that right." 156
The law of standing, therefore, prohibits the assertion of constitutional
rights that are held in common, yet generalized statutory rights regularly con-
stitute a basis to sue in the federal courts. Therefore, had a statute existed
prohibiting the federal government from supporting religion and giving citi-
zens authority to enforce it, standing to sue would have been granted in Valley
Forge. Since plaintiffs "merely" claimed the first amendment as the source of
their separationist rights, however, their action was dismissed.
The interplay between generalized statutory and constitutional rights
demonstrates clearly that despite protestations to the contrary in Flast, tax-
payer/citizen standing rules are based upon separation of powers concerns-
not concern for the party's stakes in the controversy. No doubt the "personal
stake" of any citizen suing under the Freedom of Information Act is identical
to that of the plaintiffs in Richardson.
Grants of generalized statutory standing also lead one to question the the-
ory of the citizen standing cases. Cases recognizing standing for "any person"
based upon congressional grants would seem to indicate that although rights
are shared by all, this is not necessarily fatal to standing.157 Other cases make
it clear that judicially cognizable "rights" can be based directly upon the Con-
stitution.1 58 Apparently it is only the combination of the two-generalized
rights based upon the Constitution-that is unreviewable under article III.
Thus far, however, the Court has failed to offer a meaningful explanation of
the aversion. What Eugene Rostow has called "the constitutional instincts of
the nation, always the strongest force in its public life,"' 1 9 suggest that the
rights reflected in the Constitution merit every bit as much judicial protection
as do those contained in the United States Code.
d Enforceability of the Constitution
The taxpayer/citizen standing decisions of the Supreme Court accept
quite readily the possibility that the particularized injury requirement might
render certain constitutional provisions unenforceable. Speaking directly to
the issue in Richardson, Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court:
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate
this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any
particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to
155. 418 U.S. at 217.
156. Id. at 224 n.14.
157. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (Endangered Species Act); Environmental Protec-
tion Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (Freedom of Information Act).
158. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
159. E. RosTow, THE IDEAL IN LAW 3 (1978).
1983]
NORTH CA4ROLINA LW REVIEW
the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance
of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. 160
The rights asserted in Valley Forge, Richardson, and Reservists Committee
are not among those sorts of interests designed to be left to the protection of
the democratic process in our system of government. Speaking of the same
amendment to the Constitution that was implicated in Valley Forge, the Court
declared almost forty years ago in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty
and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend upon the outcome of no elections.' 6 '
Similarly, the rights asserted under the incompatablity clause in Reservists
Committee were especially appropriate for judicial enforcement. 162 Since
plaintiffs claimed that members of Congress were in specific violation of the
Constitution, and that conflict arising from dual allegiance resulted in unfair
representation in the legislature, it might have been unrealistic to expect the
political process to provide relief. In analogous situations, the judiciary has
been willing to police the very operation of the political process. 163
The information sought by the litigants in Richardson was purportedly
desired to allow citizens to "intelligently follow the actions of Congress...
[and] fulfill [their] obligations" as members of the electorate. 64 Accordingly,
judicial intervention would have worked to implement rather than subvert the
democratic process. Therefore, it would seem apparent that it is inappropriate
to base a complete prohibition of public constitutional actions upon reliance
on the democratic process.
It is evident that the present law of standing to bring generalized constitu-
tional actions is unacceptable. Citizen and taxpayer suits, though indistin-
guishable in terms of stake in the controversy, are examined under different
standards. Citizen cases are barred. Taxpayer cases are permitted-but only
if the plaintiff can successfully meet a "nexus" test that has no discernible
relationship to general standing principles. Without convincing explanation,
local taxpayer cases and actions challenging congressional expenditures under
the establishment clause are given judicial cognizance. Yet the distribution of
governmental largesse in the form of real property to religious organizations is
160. 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
161. 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
162. See H. HART & H. WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 60
(Supp. 1981).
163. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (allegation that a state statute deprived state
voters of due process presented a constitutional cause of action, not a nonjusticiable political
question).
164. 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974).
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not actionable by either citizens or taxpayers. Even worse, the entire standing
framework is cast in conclusory terms relating to directness of injury, while
complex and recurring issues concerning the appropriate role of the judiciary
in our system of government remain unaddressed.
II. JUSTICES REHNQUIST AND POWELL-M R.4BURY'S PRIVATE RIGHTS
MODEL
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
Unitedfor Separation of Church & State165 is quite explicit in its adoption of a
private rights theory of judicial review. Characterizing the judicial power to
measure the authority of government as "legitimate only in the last resort,"1 6 6
the majority opinion reads recent standing decisions to require "at an irreduci-
ble minimum . . . injury." 167 Plaintiffs argument for standing based upon
rights created by the establishment clause was, therefore, wholly outside the
scope of this requirement. The complaint actually asserted only the right to a
particular kind of government conduct. The Court found that this allegation
"cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III without draining those re-
quirements of meaning."16 8 Further, the recognition in the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit of a personal constitutional right to separation of church
and state was based upon the "importance of the claim on the merits," thus
violating the aphorism that standing focuses on the party, not the issues.' 69
Valley Forge could not be distinguished from United States v. Richardson 170
and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War 17 1 sinoe there is "no
principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values
"172
The theory espoused by Justice Rehnquist leads one easily to the conclu-
sion that there should have been no standing in Valley Forge. The most obvi-
ous problem with this rationale, however, is that it has little relationship to the
current law of standing. Flast v. Cohen, 173 which the Court cited repeatedly,
stands in bald contradiction to the private rights theory of Valley Forge.
Plaintiffs in Flast were obviously incapable of demonstrating injury-in-fact. It
was the absence of particularized harm that necessitated the creation of the
nexus test. The Flast complaint asserted nothing more than the right to a par-
ticular kind of government conduct-conduct that does not violate the estab-
lishment clause. Further, the second prong of the nexus test, which requires
that a taxpayer action be based upon a specific constitutional limitation, is a
165. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
166. Id. at 471 (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)).
167. Id. at 472.
168. Id. at 483.
169. Id. at 484.
170. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
171. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
172. 454 U.S. at 484.
173. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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clear institutionalization of the belief that a "hierarchy of constitutional val-
ues" can be recognized.
Nor are Flast and the cases decided under its banner the only departures
from a private rights theory. 174 Standing has been granted on a number of
occasions by employing creative definitions of "injury" in actions that are es-
sentially indistinguishable from mere citizen suits.' 7 5 It is perhaps a more
charitable reading of Justice Rehnquist's opinion, therefore, to regard Valley
Forge as the implicit announcement of an article III policy that will eventually
result in the overruling of Flast and its progeny.' 76 Similarly, Justice Powell
called for the return to a pure private rights model in his concurring opinion in
United States v. Richardson.177 Acknowledging the obviously public nature of
actions such as Fast and Baker v. Carr,178 both of which he called "sui
generis,"' 179 Justice Powell claimed that absent a specific statuary grant of re-
view, standing requires that the plaintiff "allege some particularized injury
that sets him apart from the man on the street."' 08 Otherwise, the conclusion
is "inescapable" that relaxed standing rules would "significantly alter the allo-
cation of power at the national level."'' Although a pure private rights
model cannot be squared with current standing law, it is far from clear that
such a standard should be rejected. Few would deny that citizen and taxpayer
rules need to be reconsidered. The question that remains, therefore, is
whether a private rights model requiring the demonstration of individualized
injury separate and distinct from the claimed constitutional violation is a good
idea. Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and apparently Chief Justice Burger 18 2 have
174. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
175. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). For a discussion of "injury," see infra
notes 260-88 and accompanying text.
176. Justice Rehnquist has received no small degree of criticism for a purported tendency to
distort precedents and to ignore aspects of past decisions that run contrary to the Justice's desired
result in the case before him. See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 293 (1976); Nichol, Backing Into the Future: The Burger Court and the Federal Forum, 30
KAN. L. REv. 341, 379-80 (1982).
177. 418 U.S. at 188-89 (Powell, J., concurring).
178. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
179. 418 U.S. at 195 n.17.
180. Id. at 194.
181. Id. at 188.
182. Chief Justice Burger authored the opinion for the Court in Reservists Committee, in
which he claimed to reaffirm the holding ofExparte Ievitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam), that
standing cannot be based upon "injury all citizens share." 418 U.S. at 220. Certainly that would
appear to make him an advocate of a pure private rights model. One wonders, however, about the
rationale for the holding in Reservists Committee. The Chief Justice claimed that particularized
injury was essential in that case because it would serve to lend a "dimension of specificity" and a
"complete perspective upon the adverse consequences ... from the specific set of facts." Id. at
221. Unfortunately, the action in Reservists Committee, which was based upon the incompatibility
clause and sought to prohibit members of Congress from being officers in the Armed Forces Re-
serve, would not have been rendered more concrete by particularized injury. The suit presented a
clear constitutional question and further factual development was either unnecessary or perfectly
achievable by the parties already present. Therefore, the grounds for denying standing appeared
to have no relation to the lawsuit.
To complicate matters further, the Chief Justice authored Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971), in which standing was granted in a taxpayer action similiar to Flast. Accordingly, it is
difficult to make a good estimate of the views of the Chief Justice.
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indicated their preferences for just such a standard.
A. Evaluating the Particularized Injury Requirement
An absolute, across-the-board article III requirement of particularized in-
jury would entail several components. As a basic constitutional threshold, the
injury-in-fact requirement dating from Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp 18 3 would be applicable to all cases. The private rights
model, however, goes further. Because the standard would demand injury
that sets the plaintiff apart "from the man on the street,"' 18 4 the violation of a
consititutional right that affects the citizenry as a whole would fall outside the
definition of "injury."
Professors Jaffe and Berger have presented strong cases that a constitu-
tional requirement of injury cannot be based upon the history or language of
article 111.185 Even if an injury component could be historically sustained,
however, nothing in the case or controversy requirement supports aparticular-
ized injury standard. A reading of article III does not lead one to the conclu-
sion that the violation of constitutionally recognized rights creates no injury.
Therefore, it seems clear that the individualized harm rule of Reservists Com-
mittee and Valley Forge is not constitutionally mandated.18 6
A particularized injury standard would, however, lend a degree of consis-
tency to the standing doctrine. The judicial power of the federal courts could
be exercised only upon a showing of individual harm. There would be no
need for separate taxpayer or citizen standing rules. Such actions would be
barred because the rights asserted are "public" and "generalized." There
would of course be inconveniences. Flast and the local exception to the Froth-
ingham rule would have to be overturned. The establishment clause would be
rendered unenforceable in some instances, as would a number of other consti-
tutional provisions. But the Court could counter that it was operating within
its properly limited role in our system of government.
Consistency alone, however, even if it could be achieved,' 8 7 is an insuffi-
cient reason to adhere to a particularized harm standard. Rules granting
standing to all taxpayers or citizens would tend to promote consistency as well,
though they might not adequately measure article III interests. Accordingly, it
is necessary to examine the reasons put forth by the Justices to support a par-
ticularized injury requirement.
183. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
184. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
185. L. JAFFEsupra note 36, at 462-67 (1965); Berger, Standing to Sue in PublicActions: Is It a
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 837-40 (1969).
186. See Monaghan, supra note 36.
187. Of course a "true consistency" for purposes of article III analysis would necessitate not
only the overruling of Fast, but also the reconsideration of cases such as Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455 (1973); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 269
U.S. 186 (1962). Further, if particularized harm is constitutionally mandated, citizen actions
based upon statutory standing grants such as TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), and Scripps-How-
ard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942), would become questionable.
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Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has given its most complete explana-
tion of the policies underlying an actual injury requirement in the two cases
directly rejecting citizen standing, Reservists Committee and Valley Forge. In
those cases, two broad categories of interests were identified. The first, and
most carefully emphasized, category can generally be characterized as "con-
creteness interests," which assure that a sufficient factual record will be
presented to enlighten judicial inquiry. The second and ultimately more es-
sential category of article III considerations reflects separation of powers con-
cerns. Any departure from an individualized injury requirement would
purportedly alter the relationship between the judiciary and its coequal
branches of the federal government. These diverse rationales will be ex-
amined in turn.
1. Concreteness Interests
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Reservists Committee de-
dared that concrete injury provides an "essential dimension of specificity." 188
Particularized harm supplies a "complete perspective upon the adverse conse-
quences . . . from the specific set of facts." 189 Similarly, Justice Rehnquist
declared in Valley Forge that a requirement of actual distinct injury furnishes
a "concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the conse-
quences of judicial action." 190
Apparently, the theory is that concrete, individualized harm is indispen-
sable to make the record factually complete and the advocacy sufficiently in-
formed to meet judicial standards. In practice, however, particularized injury
is a poor predictor of either the adequacy of the record or the quality of coun-
sel.191 More often, the injury rule has been used to exclude plaintiffs who
have demonstrated effective and continuing interest in the issues litigated.192
Further, it is clearly inappropriate for the standing determination to turn on
the perceived quality of representation. 193
The lack of relationship between concreteness interests and the specific
injury requirement is perhaps best demonstrated by a review of the major
cases in which the court has employed the doctrine. In Richardson it is diffi-
cult to see how a more "concrete" factual record would have aided the Court
in determining whether the refusal to publish the CIA budget violated article
188. 418 U.S. at 220-21.
189. Id. at 221.
190. 454 U.S. at 472.
191. See Parker & Stone, Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 775
(1978) ("One plaintiff can be granted standing although he is an inadequate representative of the
interest of his class, while another, fully qualified representative is eliminated at the threshold for
lack of standing").
192. Consider, for example, the plaintiffs ousted in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)
(Sierra Club lacked standing to challenge extensive skiing development in the Sequoia National
Forest), and in Valley Forge.
193. Professor Davis has argued that the theory of using the standing doctrine to distinguish
between better and worse representatives of various federal interests "deserves quiet burial.
Standing should not depend upon the probable manner in which a party will present a case
.... " K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.00-04, at 724 (Supp. 1970).
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I, section 9.194 In Reservists Committee plaintiffs claimed that it was unconsti-
tutional to be a member of Congress and an officer in the Armed Forces Re-
serve at the same time.195 That assertion also appears to be both concrete and
specific. In either case, if the record did prove to be factually deficient, the
trial court could have either taken steps to assure a fuller perspective,' 96 or
found against the plaintiffs upon the facts as presented.
Finally, consider Valley Forge. The constitutionality of a single transfer
of real property to a religious organization was at issue. The various opinions
of the Third Circuit and Supreme Court relate the factual underpinnings of
the transfer in totality. 197 Plaintiffs were well represented at all three levels of
the federal judiciary. The absence of what the Court characterized as particu-
larized injury simply bore no relation to whether the case would have been
presented in the adversary context article III is purported to require.
Most commentators have suggested that ideological plaintiffs are even
more apt than monetarily motivated litigants to present a case in its best
light.198 The costs of major litigation alone assure a substantial "personal
stake." 99 In addition, the continuing commitment to various interests that
initially brings ideological litigants into the federal courts should enhance
rather than detract from the quality of representation.
It is also clear that in public constitutional actions even the typical
Hohfeldian, injury-laden plaintiff is apt to be ideologically motivated. Profes-
sor Tushnet has correctly pointed out that the "material rewards of public
interest litigation rarely justify the effort." 2° ° On an even more amorphous
level the typical plaintiff in a reapportionment case does not bear the expense
and inconvenience of litigation merely to assure that his vote is changed from
eighty to ninety-five percent of its ideal weight. More likely, lie is trying to
force the defendant to comply with the Constitution.
None of these considerations mandates that every ideological plaintiff be
given standing to sue in the federal courts. They do demonstrate, however,
that the particularized injury requirement cannot be rationally based on a ju-
dicial belief that only individually harmed plaintiffs will present a case in the
appropriate adversary context.
194. See 418 U.S. at 183-84 (Powell, J., concurring).
195. 418 U.S. at 210-11.
196. Professor Tushnet describes such tools as "nonconstitutional auxiliary devices" designed
to ensure that the Court has a complete understanding of the issues. Tushnet, The Sociology of
Article III. A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1698, 1707 (1980).
197. See Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 253-54
(3d Cir. 1980) (outlining facts in detail); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 466-70 (majority opinion), 512
n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 36, § 3531, at 224-28; Jaffe, The
Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintif, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 1033 (1968); Tushnet, supra note 196.
199. "The idle and whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a specter which
haunts the legal literature, not the courtroom." Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-4 Func-
tional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 674 (1973).
200. Tushnet, supra note 196, at 1711.
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2. Separation of Powers
The more weighty justifiction put forth for a particularized injury require-
ment lies in a healthy judicial deference to coequal branches of government.
Justice Powell based his willingness to overrule Flast, and thus prohibit gener-
alized constitutional claims, almost entirely upon separation of powers con-
cerns: "It seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or
citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation power at the national
level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government. ' 20 1 Chief
Justice Burger's claim in Reservists Committee that citizen suits have "no
boundaries" and could result in "government by injunction" reflects similar
misgivings.202 The Court in Valley Forge refused to recognize standing based
directly upon the first amendment in part because to do so would purportedly
affect "relationships between the coequal arms of the National
government. '20 3
Clearly, judicial concern for the appropriate role of the federal courts in
our tripartite scheme of government is a significant interest. It is less clear,
however, that the Hohfeldian/non-Hohfeldian distinction,2°4 upon which a
private rights theory of standing is based, is in any sense an effective measur-
ing rod of what that role should be. The short answer to an attempt to justify
the particularized harm requirement by separation of powers considerations is
that such interests are supposed to be irrelevant to the standing inquiry. For at
least the past twenty years, it has been understood that the standing doctrine
focuses on the party seeking federal relief rather than the issues sought to be
adjudicated. 205 In Flast, the Court specifically held that the "question
whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not,
by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judi-
cial interference in areas committed to other branches of the Federal Govern-
ment."2°6  Separation of powers questions are purportedly within the
bailiwick of the political question doctrine.
20 7
Even if it becomes acceptable to surreptitiously introduce separation of
powers or federalism issues into standing analysis, a particularized injury re-
201. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
202. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974).
203. 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982). Professor Bickel similarly argued against citizen or taxpayer
standing primarily upon a separation of powers basis. He claimed that such broad standing grants
would "materially alter the function of judicial review and seriously undermine any acceptable
justification for it." A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 122.
204. See generally Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
205. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-100 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
206. Flast, 392 U.S. at 100. See Parker & Stone, Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 771, 775 (1978):
Although this is a legitimate concern, the role allocation burden is not easily carried by a
doctrine which purports to have as its fundamental goal the measurement of the qualifi-
cations of the party seeking access. As defined by the courts, "personal stake" is not
germane to the question of balance between the judicial, legislative and executive roles.
207. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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quirement has little bearing on defining the proper role of the judiciary. Obvi-
ously, standing determinations have much less effect upon perceived judicial
"capital" than do decisions on the merits of constitutional claims. Standing
guidelines were rigid during the heyday of substantive due process, when the
Court stretched its authority beyond acceptable boundaries.208 Modem
moves to "put the judiciary in its place" flow from decisions on controversial
topics such as abortion,2 °9 school desegregation, 2 10 school prayer,2 11 and
prison reform 2 2-all of which fall neatly under an individual injury theory.
The cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized implied causes of
action based directly upon the Constitution also illustrate the basic irrelevence
of particularized harm to separation of powers concerns. In Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics2 13 a damages action
premised directly upon the fourth amendment was authorized against agents
of the executive branch. Similarly, in Davis v. Passman the Court counte-
nanced a cause of action based upon the equal protection component of the
due process clause.2 14 In Davis an administrative assistant was allowed to sue
her boss, a United States Congressman, for sex discrimination. In both in-
stances, the standing of the plaintiffs was clear because of the presence of indi-
vidual injury. Further, as in all of the public actions described in this article,
the suits were founded directly upon constitutional wrongs. Yet separation of
powers problems that were clearly more acute than those lurking in Valley
Forge and Richardson in terms of sheer intrusion into the workings of the
legislative and executive branches posed no hurdle to recovery. Moreover, a
demand for particularized injury furthers no elucidated role of the federal ju-
diciary. Scholars such as Alexander Bickel and Archibald Cox have argued
that the function of the Supreme Court is tied to its character as a judicial
rather than political body.215 Accordingly, judicial review is justified by the
208. See, e.g., such decisions as Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court's retreat is recorded in such cases as Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
209. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
210. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
211. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
212. Jones v. Zockhart, 484 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1973); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d
Cir. 1970).
213. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
214. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
215. Professor Bickel argued that the best support for judicial review is not to be found in the
premises of Marbury v. Madison, but in the ability of the Court "to appeal to men's better natures,
to call forth their aspirations" on fundamental constitutional principles. As a result, the legislative
perspective, in which the "pressure for immediate results is strong enough and emotions ride high
enough, [that] men will ordinarily prefer to act on expediency rather than take the long view," can
be tempered by the "sober second thought" of judicial review. A. BicKEI., supra note 2, at 20, 25.
Archibald Cox has similarly described the legitimacy of judicial review by contrasting it with
the political process:
The political branches are the forums where group-interests are served, coalitions are
built, loyalities are formed, and obligations respected. The function of the Court--the
role implicitly assigned to it by history as well as the fact of its having been created as a
court-is illuminated by contrast with the political branches. Its decisions are legitimate
only when it seeks to dissociate itself from individual or group interests and to judge by
disinterested and more objective standards.
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unique position the Court occupies in our governmental framework. Re-
moved a step from the pressures of politics, the judiciary may be hoped to
offer the "long view";2 16 to provide the "sober second thought. ' 217 On troub-
lesome constitutional issues the Court might be hoped to "quicken the moral
education 218 of the populace.
Some commentators go even further. Owen Fiss argues that the very
"function of a judge is to give concrete meaning and application to our consti-
tutional values. '219 Eugene Rostow characterizes the Supreme Court not only
as the guardian and expositor of the Constitution, but also as part of "the great
unifying force, and spiritual center of the nation's life."'220 Such accolades, no
doubt, prove to be a bit quixotic. If, however, the federal judiciary is to be
expected to play a substantial part in the nation's constitutional dialogue, it is
unclear why the "discussion" should be limited only to rights triggered by
particularized harm. For example, the federal courts have labored for a gener-
ation to carve out the appropriate first amendment barriers between church
and state. It seems unacceptable that federal actions to support religion
should be exempt from the inquiry merely because all suffer from the constitu-
tional violation in the same way.
A particularized inquiry requirement is also irrelevant to process-oriented
theories of judicial review. John Hart Ely's persuasive arguments for judicial
review that sustains, rather than thwarts, the democratic process call for activ-
ism to clear the "[c]hannels of [p]olitical [c]hange. '' 221 Although the protec-
tion of allegedly fundamental values is deemed beyond judicial authority,
rights that are "critical to the functioning of an open and effective democratic
process" 222 must be safeguarded strenuously.
Such "process" rights may, however, fall on either side of the Hohfeldian
line. The plaintiffs in Richardson sought to attack the concealment of CIA
expenditures, a secret that hampers efforts at political reform.223 Similiarly,
the Reservist Committee plaintiffs tried to remove an impediment to effective
representation-namely the supposed conffict of interest resulting from hold-
ing office in both the legislative and executive branches of government. Yet
both actions were dismissed without consideration of the need to "clear chan-
nels" because injury was purportedly indirect and shared.
The particularized harm standard, in short, has at best only a remote con-
nection to reasonably measured judicial authority. One may well accept that
the need for intervention is at its highest when the victims of government ac-
A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 108 (1976).
216. A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 25.
217. Id. at 20.
218. A. Cox, supra note 215, at 117.
219. Fiss, Forward- The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9 (1979).
220. E. RosTow, supra note 159, at 4.
221. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105 (1980). Louis Lusky has espoused a somewhat
similar theory of judicial review. See L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975).
222. J. ELY, supra note 221, at 105.
223. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92 (1978).
[Vol. 61
STANDING AND VALLEY FORGE
tion are discrete and insular minorities. Yet exclusion from the political pro-
cess is not the only basis for judicial review, and methods of "exclusion" may
be broad-based. The individual harm standard takes insufficient cognizance
of the fact that "many rights may be held in gross as well as in personam. "224
Accordingly, as a measuring rod for judicial authority, it represents no more
than an unexplained refusal to enforce certain substantive guarantees.
B. Marbury Reconsidered
To demand particularized injury as an article III requisite is to constitu-
tionalize Marbury's private rights model as the outer boundary of federal judi-
cial competence. As Professor Bickel made clear a generation ago, however,
the "power to which Marshall laid claim is not the full measure of the Court's
authority in our day."'225
Marbury was clear in its holding that the Court could decide constitu-
tional issues in cases properly brought before it. Chief Justice Marshall, how-
ever, did not claim that judicial interpretation reached beyond the litigants to
bind other branches of government. Nevertheless, almost two centuries of
constitutional interpretation coupled with the perceived status of the Supreme
Court in the eyes of the populace have clearly established the Court as the
final arbiter of the Constitution.226 The Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron
declared no less. 2 2 7
Americans accept as "necessary to the constitutional order" 228 what Pro-
fessor Monaghan has called the "special function" 229 of the Court to interpret
the Constitution. Therefore, any view of the federal judiciary that posits its
authority as merely the power to decide private disputes bolstered by the free-
dom to "disregard" unconstitutional legislation ignores reality.230 It would be
equally inaccurate to characterize the nation's interest in University of Califor-
nia Board of Regents v. Bakke231 as a widespread concern for the welfare of
one potential medical student.
Further, the Court's decisions, especially those of the last decade, have
embraced for the Court the role of "referee" between various branches of gov-
ernment even when "private" rights are not at stake. In Buckley v. Valeo 
2
the Court protected the executive appointment power from legislative usurpa-
224. Monaghan, supra note 36, at 1369.
225. A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 188.
226. See, e.g., A. BICKE.L, supra note 2, at 14; A. Cox, supra note 215, at 117.
227. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). As a unanimous Court stated in Cooper, "[t]he federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitu-
tional system." Id. at 18.
228. Kauper, The Supreme Court: Hybrid Organ of State, 21 Sw. L.J. 573, 587 (1967).
229. Monaghan, supra note 36, at 1370.
230. See Chayes, he Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1283-
84 (1976): "[Whatever its historical validity, the traditional model is clearly invalid as a descrip-
tion of much current civil litigation in the federal courts."
231. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
232. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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tion by striking down portions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
This was done despite the absence of traditional private interests to challenge
the makeup of the Federal Election Commission. Justice Rehnquist's contro-
versial opinion for the Court in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usury adjudicates
no private rights.233 The case is a direct examination of the powers of local
government in the face of federal legislation. In other instances, the Court has
abandoned the narrow role of "pure" expositor of private rights by allowing
states to litigate federalism issues on their own behalf.234 Accordingly, it is
late in the day to construct a standing doctrine solely upon the premises an-
nounced by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury.
C The Thin Line of Injury
The rejection of citizen standing in Valley Forge is based upon an alleged
distinction between private and public rights. In theory this dichotomy can be
plainly drawn. Litigants who claim particularized harm assert interests that
are in some manner distinctively their own. Government action has affected
their pocketbooks235 or limited their liberties236 in objective ways that not
only reflect individual, measurable harm, but that are also capable of being
alleviated by judicial decree.237
Ideological or citizen litigants, on the other hand, sue primarily as repre-
sentatives of the public interest. Such plaintiffs either suffer no harm, or harm
that is indistinguishable from the injury incurred by all other members of the
populace. Since they do not complain of government behavior that restrains
their freedom or causes them financial loss, they seek only to force the govern-
ment to comply with the law-an obviously abstract, subjective, and genera-
lized interest. In short, ideological, non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs have no
grievances of their own. Rather, they apparently search the statute books and
monitor the activities of government in an attempt to find allegedly illegal
government behavior.
The actual operation of the particularized injury standard, however, has
not resulted in such a clear distinction between private and ideological plain-
tiffs. Modern standing decisions reveal that there is no easily ascertainable
line to be drawn between public and private rights. The types of interests
subject to judicial cognizance have expanded beyond concrete claims and in-
clude a variety of subjective, intangible concerns. The quantum of injury re-
quired to satisfy article III can scarcely be discovered through any objective
233. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
234. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966); Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 84-90.
235. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (plain-
tiffs claimed that government-encouraged competition would impair business opportunities); Har-
ding v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) (same).
236. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parent fined for failure to send child
to school allowed standing to challenge state compulsory attendance law); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (197 1) (plaintiff threatened with prosecution under state criminal syndicalism statute given
standing to present first amendment challenge).
237. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975).
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calculus. As government activity has become more widespread, and its effects
correspondingly more incidental, the distinction between direct and indirect
sources of harm has been muddied. Accordingly, the very definition of indi-
vidual injury has become subject to judicial manipulation-usually in order to
accomodate concerns ranging from judicial deference to the perceived impor-
tance of the claim on the merits. Thus, the distinction upon which the Valley
Forge decision rests is somewhat illusory.238
The injury-in-fact requirement has been diluted in a variety of ways.
Most obviously, the universe of injuries that article III is deemed to encompass
has been noticeably enlarged. The losses suffered through vote dilution and
diminished representation that result from a malapportioned legislature,239 for
example, are far more generalized than traditionally recognized physical or
financial injuries. The abrogation of certain protected "social" rights repre-
sents, in relative terms, only a modest impact upon an individual plaintiff.24°
Further, by accepting aesthetic and environmental harms as actionable
claims,241 the Court has countenanced injuries that are not only diffuse, but
also clearly subjective in that the harm is dependent upon the intellectual and
political makeup of the plaintiff.
1. Statutory Injury
The major area in which standing has been liberalized, and the paricu-
larized injury requirement commensurately diluted, is in the recognition of
statutorily granted standing rights. Standing based upon statute, despite the
absence of traditionally recognized individual harm, has become so well ac-
cepted that, at least in result, Professor Tribe is correct in his claim that "any
Article III based requirement of factual or concrete injury serves only to limit
the ability of federal courts to confer standing in the absence of statute
.... ,"242 In practical terms, a plaintiff is injured-in-fact by the government if
he has a statutory right to complain of the government's action.243
The expansion of standing pursuant to statute arises from two distinct
theories of congressional power. Early cases such as Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. FCC recognized the standing of private plaintiffs as citizen-enforcers or
238. For a perceptive analysis of the volatility of the injury requirement, see Albert, supra note
36, at 1147-54.
239. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), was such a case.
240. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972), for example, the
Supreme Court recognized the loss of "important benefits from interracial association" as an ade-
quate demonstration of injury in fact. The action was based, however, upon the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73-92.
241. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging Regu-
latory Agency Procedure, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), involved such claims.
242. L. TimBE supra note 223, at 80.
243. Justice Powell has expressed an arguably more limited view of congressional authority to
confer standing. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976). But
see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3
(1973).
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA LAWAREVIEW[
private attorneys general. 244 Rather than basing standing upon private harm,
the Court in Scripps-Howard found that plaintiffs could properly assert a cause
of action "only as representatives of the public interest. '2 45 More recently, in
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.246 a group of plaintiffs were
given such representational standing under the Civil Rights Act of 1968. In
Trafficante standing was based not only upon new statutorily created "pri-
vate" rights,247 but also upon plaintiffs' status as enforcers of the fair housing
laws: "The complainants act not only on their own behalf but also 'as private
attorneys general in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be a
highest priority.' The role of private attorneys general is not uncommon in
modern legislative programs." 248
Representational statutory standing was taken a step further by the Courtin Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.249 The Court held that a "tester" 250 had
standing under the Fair Housing Act to challenge steering practices despite the
fact that plaintiff apparently approached the realtor-defendant fully expecting
to receive false information and without any intention of actually buying or
renting a home.251 If a plaintiff asserts no desire to actually obtain housing, it
is clear that the sole interest upon which standing could be based is that of
citizen-enforcer of federal fair housing laws.
The private attorneys general theory of statutory standing reveals once
again the unspoken separation of powers roots of the standing doctrine. Be-
cause standing can be based upon a statutory grant even if no private rights
are asserted, the constitutional propriety of the private attorneys general the-
ory has been debated with vigor.252 Ultimately, however, the development of
244. 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942). In Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (1943), for exam-
ple, Judge Frank wrote: "[Tihere is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from empower-
ing any person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving such a controversy, even if the
sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak,
private Attorney Generals." See also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477
(1940).
245. 316 U.S. at 14.
246. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
247. Id. at 208.
248. Id. at 211. The importance of the statutory grant of standing was perhaps made most
explicit in Justice White's concurrence (joined by Justices Powell and Blackmun): "Absent the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, I would have great difficulty in concluding that petitioners complaint in
this case presented a case or controversy ... ." Id. at 212.
249. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
250. A "tester" is an individual who, without intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment,
poses as a renter or purchaser for the purpose of collecting evidende of unlawful racial steering
practices. Id at 1121.
251. Id.
252. Professor Jaffe asserts that any citizen can constitutionally sue in the public interest. See
Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant In Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldan or Ideological Plaintiff, 116
U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633, 635 (1971). Justice
Harlan's dissent in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 116-33 (1968), also argues that article III poses no
barrier to private attorneys general standing. Professor Davis disagrees energetically in Davis,
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHi. L. RE. 601, 617 (1968).
A thorough consideration of the propriety of private attorneys general actions would require
an analysis not only of the reach of article III, but also the necessary and proper clause and, in
some instances, the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Nichol, An Examina-
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the complete scope of the doctrine has been rendered essentially moot by the
emergence of a second theory of congressional power to grant standing.
The Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly that "Congress may create
legally enforceable rights where none before existed." 253 The invasion of such
congressionally created rights constitutes injury-in-fact. 254 From these simple
premises, it follows that Congress can create "private" enforcement rights in
individual plaintiffs no matter how generalized or intangible the asserted in-
terests may be. Thus in Trafficante, for example, the Court gave credence to
the statutorily based right to assert the "benefits of living in an integrated com-
munity. '255 Similiarly, in Reservists Committee, the majority indicated that
standing would have been clearly appropriate had Congress enacted a statute
guaranteeing the right of citizens to demand that their representatives operate
free of conflicts of interest.256
The full scope of the congressional power to confer standing by the crea-
tion of private rights is best demonstrated by envirommental cases such as TVA
v. Hill,257 the noted snail darter case. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the continued
construction of the Tellico Dam under the Endangered Species Act. Section
I l(g) of the Act, which provides that "any person" may commence an action
to enforce the provision's dictates, 258 was deemed a clear basis for standing.259
The Act apparently creates enforceable rights, lodged in every person, to de-
mand government action to protect various endangered animals from
extinction.
The "rights" that supported standing in Hill are every bit as generalized
and intangible as those characterized as beyond the cognizance of article III in
Richardson, Reservists Committee, and Valley Forge. Indeed, an interest could
scarcely be more generalized than one held by "any person." Moreover, a
theory of enforceable rights that recognizes such interests as an appropriate
basis for standing broadly encompasses the private attorneys general concept.
The ability of the legislature to create new statutory interests, no matter how
lion of Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 175 (1976).
253. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 136 (1947). See also
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975): "Congress may create a statutory right of entitlement
the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even when the plaintiff would have
suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute."
254. See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973): "Congress may enact stat-
utes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing even though no injury would exist
without the statute."
255. 409 U.S. at 208.
256. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 224 n.14 (1974).
Similarly, in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), the Court bolstered its
holding of "tester" standing under the Fair Housing Act by holding that "Congress has thus con-
ferred on all 'persons' a legal right to truthful information about available housing." Id. at 1121.
If Congress can make the right to receive "truthful information" enforceable by a plaintiff with no
apparent interest other than instituting federal litigation, it would appear that there is no limit to
the ability of Congress to create judicially cognizable rights.
257. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
258. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1976).
259. 437 U.S. at 164 n.15.
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ephemeral or broad-based, effectively places statutory standing beyond the
reaches of the injury-in-fact limitation. Congress could apparently create
shared, judicially-cognizable "rights" to a separationist government, an effi-
cient bureaucracy, or an integrated society with equal ease. It is clear, there-
fore, that the particularized harm standard does not pose a meaningful curb
upon the ability of Congress to grant citizen standing.
2. The Volatility of Injury
The Hohfeldian/non-Hohfeldian distinction has also been blurred
through judicial manipulation of the definition of injury. Injury, as the term is
employed in article III jurisprudence, is hardly a self-defining concept.
Though designed to provide an overriding measurement of justiciability, the
requisite threshold injury fluctuates both according to the novelty of the claim
presented and the perceived import of the action on the merits.
The particularized harm standard ought to require a demonstration that
the acts of the defendant have impinged upon protected legal rights of the
plaintiff. The "rights" cognizable upon review may indeed be broad-encom-
passing political,260 associational, 261 environmental, 262 financial,263 and liber-
tarian264 interests-but the harm to the plaintiff must be concrete. "Concrete"
injury can be assumed to entail something more than mere allegations that the
government is not complying with the law and that the plaintiff is unhappy
with the government's conduct. Reservists Committee and Valley Forge pur-
port to be based upon just such a distinction between specific, concrete harm
and a generalized desire for legal government behavior. The distinction, how-
ever, has not always been easy to discover in the Court's decisions.
In Abington School District v. Schempp ,265 for example, the Supreme
Court struck down a school board requirement that passages from the Bible be
read in public schools. The record in the case disclosed that individual stu-
dents could be excused from participation upon written request of their par-
ents.2 6 6 The Court, however, considered the absence of coercion irrelevant to
the actionability of the claim: "Nor are these required exercises mitigated by
the fact that individual students may absent themselves upon parental request,
for that fact furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the
Establishment Clause."267
TheAbington case, like its predecessor Engel v. Vitale,268 can be squeezed
into a paricularized harm model. The school-children plaintiffs sustained in-
260. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
261. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
262. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669(1973).
263. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
264. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
265. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
266. Id. at 205-07.
267. Id. at 224-25.
268. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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dividual injury through the subtle coercion that exists, despite the freedom to
opt out, whenever the power of government is placed behind a particular reli-
gious creed. Abington and Engel, however, specifically reject the need to al-
lege such subtle pressures to state a claim under the establishment clause.
269
Rather, the Court has indicated:
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individu-
als or not. . . . [T]he purposes underlying the Establishment Clause
go much further than [coercion]. . . . Its first and most immediate
purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion
tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.2 70
These establishment clause holdings are not only contrary to the result in
Valley Forge, but they also specifically reject the need for allegations of partic-
ularized harm. InAbington and Engel the Court declared that the mere exist-
ence of laws establishing religion, without more, is actionable under the
Constitution.27 1 The "harm" flowing from the government's violation of the
first amendment is all that is required to achieve standing.
The 1973 decision in Norwood v. Harrison272 is also inconsistent with a
particularized injury requirement. In Norwood, the parents of four Mississippi
school children successfully challenged that state's textbook loan program as
applied to racially discriminatory private schools. Chief Justice Burger's opin-
ion for the Court did not address the standing issue. The complaint alleged,
however, and the Court found, that Mississippi's action in funding the book
loan program was unconstitutional since it "provided direct state aid to ra-
cially segregated education." 27
3
Again, one can stretch the Norwood decision into a particularized injury
framework. The opinion contains a passing reference to a claim by the plain-
tiffs that the lending program "impeded the process of fully desegregating
public schools."' 274 That potential impediment to the achievement of educa-
tional equality might indeed have been sufficient to constitute injury-in-fact.
Yet, the gist of the Norwood opinion is not that public education was being
harmed, but rather, that Mississippi was engaged in activity that ran afoul of
the equal protection clause. It was the affirmative contribution to private dis-
crimination that was scrutinized and found to be constitutionally infirm.2 75
The district court in Norwood had made an express finding that the "textbook
loans did not interfere with or impede the State's acknowledged duty to estab-
269. Abington, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9; Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-3 1.
270. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-31 (emphasis added). Accord Abinglon, 374 U.S. at 224-25.
271. Abington, 374 U.S. at 224-25; Engel, 370 U.S. at 431. See generally Sutherland, Establish-
mentAccording to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REv. 25 (1962).
272. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
273. Id. at 457.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 463-68.
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lish a unitary school system. ... 276 The Supreme Court, however, felt no
compulsion to reject the trial court determination. Rather, the absence of
proven harm was deemed "irrelevant," since "the constitutional infirmity of
the. . . program is that it significantly aids the organization and continuation
of a separate system of private schools which. . . may discriminate if they so
desire." 277
It is certainly possible to imagine a challenge to a loan program like that
involved in Norwood which would be based on individual harm. If, for exam-
ple, students who wished to attend private, state-assisted schools were prohib-
ited from doing so because of discriminatory admission practices, standing
would be clearly appropriate. Norwood, however, was not such a case.
Rather, plaintiffs claimed merely that Mississippi spent money to assist third
parties in discriminating against other third parties. That claim was a purely
generalized allegation of illegal government behavior.
Norwood, therefore, presents an interesting comparison with Valley
Forge. If Congress were to enact a loan program similar to that employed in
Mississippi, would a plaintiff be allowed to challenge it under the claimed
right to live under a government that does not aid discrimination? If so, as
Norwood seems to suggest, why is the right to government compliance with
the equal protection clause more compelling than the right to government ob-
servance of the separation between church and state?
Finally, the reapportionment cases demonstrate how thin the judicially
declared line separating particularized injury from generalized grievance actu-
ally turns out to be. Cases examining voting and representational rights in the
wake of Baker v. Carr278 have been treated as actions in which plaintiffs assert
individual harm.279 A citizen who complains of a poorly apportioned legisla-
ture purportly seeks to protect his voting rights from dilution. Accordingly,
the Court has viewed these plaintiffs as Hohfeldian, asserting a "plain, direct
and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes, . . . not
merely a claim of the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Gov-
ernment be administered according to law. ' 280 .
In reality, however, the relationship between the apportionment decisions
and the private rights theory is tenuous. The cases require no allegation of
actual harm resulting from inadequate representation. Although the principle
of one man, one vote does have a direct correlation to individual harm, 28' the
concept more accurately reflects the individual right to a legally constituted
government. Such cases are the clearest examples of structural constitutional
276. Id. at 460-61.
277. Id. at 467-68.
278. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
279. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980); White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
280. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 208 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1938);
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922)).
281. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-68 (1964).
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adjudication.282 Hordes of such cases arise after each national census to
straighten the frame of representative government that has become
"askew." 2 83
The public nature of the apportionment cases is demonstrated by the diffi-
culty Chief Justice Burger experienced distinguishing Baker in Rleservists Com-
mittee, in which plaintiffs relied upon the apportionment cases to support a
claim that the harm they sustained in their "ability to persuade" Congres-
sional representatives was actionable.284 The Chief Justice rejected the argu-
ment, asserting that the injury in Baker was a "concrete injury to fundamental
voting rights, as distinguished from the abstract injury in non-observance of
the Constitution."285 The distinction, however, is less than compelling.
Why was the action in Reservists Committee, which was based upon the
incompatability clause, characterized as "abstract," while a reapportionment
plaintiff's injury was deemed to be "concrete"? If concreteness described the
quality of the impact upon the plaintiff, the two cases appear analogous. Both
cases represent attempts to alleviate intangible limitations upon the ability of
citizens to be heard in the legislature. The purpose of the particularized injury
standard is to provide an overriding measure of objective harm, removed from
the merits of the case, by which the validity of judicial intervention may be
ascertained. A typical apportionment plaintiff claims that, as one of millions
of citizens, his vote carries perhaps only eighty-nine percent of its maximum
punch. Is the magnitude of that injury any greater than the injuries com-
plained of in Reservists Committee, Richardson, and a variety of other cases
dismissed for lack of "injury"?286
The response of the Chief Justice is that a reapportionment plaintiff as-
serts harm to a "fundamental" right.2 8 7 That appears, however, to be an ex-
amination of the constitutional importance of the claim rather than a measure
of the quantum of injury. Perhaps even an intangible and generalized harm to
a fundamental interest is actionable. Yet is that anything more than a judical
declaration that the rights at stake in Baker were important, while the interests
asserted in Reservists Committee were not worthy of protection? Moreover,
since the Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez,288 it has been understood that a right is "fundamental" if it is either
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution. Under that definition,
282. See Fiss, supra note 219, at 1 (1979).
283. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 298-300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
284. See Brief for Respondents at 8, Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208 (1974).
285. 418 U.S. at 223 n.13.
286. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (illegal bond-setting, sentencing, and
jury-fee practices in criminal cases); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (childless couple sued to
overturn state abortion prohibition in anticipation of pregnancy if contraception failed); Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (chill of first amendment rights by existence of Army Intelligence data-
gathering system).
287. Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. at 223 n.13.
288. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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the rights asserted in Reservists Committee, Richardson, and Valley Forge may
be even more fundamental than those litigated in Baker.
The particularized harm standard upon which Valley Forge is based takes
as its foundation the premise that a citizen's interest in "governmental regular-
ity" is abstract and nonactionable. 289 Abington, Norwood, and Baker reveal,
however, that citizens have been repeatedly permitted to sue merely to force
the government to toe the constitutional mark. Therefore, it is late in the day
to maintain a judicially constructed bright line between private and public
right as an article III requirement.
Further, the foregoing sections of this article demonstrate that such a
bright line does not exist. Over the past two decades the Supreme Court has
expressly expanded the concept of injury to include a variety of intangible
concerns. The Court has also had little choice but to accept congressionally
fashioned standing grants given to the populace as a whole. Finally, the Court
has chosen to characterize a number of generalized constitutional claims as
instances of particularized harm. In short, the private rights theory of Mar-
bury has fallen, and, as a result, the law of standing can no longer honestly use
it as a cornerstone.
D. Enforcing the Constitution
The decision to cling to a particularized harm standard in the citizen
standing cases has not been without its costs. In both Richardson and Reserv-
ists Committee the Court refused to respond to constitutional guarantees de-
spite the fact that the cases presented nonmajoritarian interests that Congress
could not be expected to safeguard. In Valley Forge, a provision of the Bill of
Rights, clearly designed to be withdrawn from "the vicissitudes of political
controversy," 290 was rendered unenforceable against the executive branch.
These results can hardly be explained by the language of either article III or
the constitutional provisions under which relief was sought.29 1 No doubt
James Madison, chief architect of the first amendment, regarded the transfer
of federally owned property to a religious organization to be
unconstitutional.292
289. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 36, at 1391 (it is "simply far too late" to deny that "a citizen's
interest in governmental regularity is a 'real' one").
290. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1942).
291. Consider former Senator Sam Ervin's colorful comment:
Is it your position that after they put this in the Constitution, for some purpose, whatever
that purpose may have been, that they were such intellectual nitwits that they didn't
contemplate that there could be no way in which the Court could even decide the ques-
tion of whether the provision was being violated?
Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1966).
292. It was President Madison's veto that prevented the grant of a federal parcel to the Baptist
church during his presidency. In his message vetoing the provision he declared:
[Tihe bill in reserving a certain parcel of land of the United States for the use of said
[church] comprises a principle and precedent for the appropriation of funds of the
United States for the use and support of religious societies, contrary to the article of the
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This article began with a discussion of the divergent judicial roles de-
scribed in Marbury-the Supreme Court as arbiter of private rights and the
Supreme Court as enforcer of constitutional limitations. Almost two centuries
of constitutional adjudication, however, have resulted in the emergence of a
special status for the Court as constitutional spokesman-a development that
has been both gradual and fortunate for our system of government. Because
they are inconsistent with the reality of modem constitutional decision mak-
ing, standing decisions such as Richardson, Reservists Committee, and Valley
Forge harm, rather than enhance, the status of the judiciary. Accordingly, the
Court should reject a private rights theory that refuses to give judicial cogni-
zance to constitutionally created rights because they are shared by the popu-
lace as a whole.
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO PUBLIC CONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS
Rejecting the private rights theory of Valley Forge, without more, hardly
provides a satisfactory solution to the "problem" of public actions. It seems
fair to say that a particularized injury requirement cannot reasonably or con-
sistently be used to prohibit public constitutional actions. But the problem
remains-when, if ever, should generalized constitutional claims be allowed in
federal courts?
Individual Justices and various commentators have suggested methods of
dealing with such causes of action. Obviously none has achieved acceptance
by a majority of the Supreme Court. Still, some have received enough atten-
tion to be properly considered alternative theories. In the following sections
this article will examine several of the major suggestions.
In brief, Kenneth Culp Davis has argued for broad standing to challenge
allegedly illegal expenditures based merely upon the status of the taxpayer.
Drawing a supposed line between a trifle and nothing, however, Professor Da-
vis would require injury in cases outside the taxpayer expenditure context.293
Justice Harlan argued in dissent in Fast that the private rights theory was not
mandated by article III. Rather than open the door completely to public ac-
tions or employ the beleaguered nexus test of Flast, however, Justice Harlan
would have granted citizen standing only when authorized by statute.294 Pro-
fessor Monaghan has supported the Harlan position.295 Finally, Professor
Jaffe has endorsed broad use of the citizen suit to enforce both statutory and
constitutional mandates. 296 These proposals will be considered in turn.
Constitution which declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting a religious
establishment"
I J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 490 (1900).
293. See Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613-17 (1968). For
further discussion of Professor Davis' views, see infra text accompanying notes 297-306.
294. Flast, 392 U.S. at 116-133 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For further discussion of Justice
Harlan's views, see infra notes 307-16 and accompanying text.
295. Monaghan, supra note 36, at 1376-79.
296. See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Ideological or Non-Hohfeldian
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
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A. Professor Davis and Taxpayer Standing
Professor Davis has argued that the law of standing should demand that a
plaintiff be "aggrieved" or "adversely affected" by the actions of the defend-
ant.297 To properly achieve this status, a plaintiff must have an interest of his
own at stake.298 Accordingly, citizen suits based upon public constitutional
rights would be excluded from the federal courts.2 99
Thus far, the argument is obviously based upon a private rights theory of
federal jurisdiction. Surprisingly, however, Professor Davis claims that any
taxpayer "should be deemed adversely affected financially by an illegal public
disbursement." 3°° Arguing for standing on a purely economic basis, Davis
claims that "large taxpayers do have a financial stake" in government expendi-
tures.301 Accordingly, in contrast to Fast, he would grant taxpayer standing
to contest any government spending, whether the claim is made under a spe-
cific or general constitutional provision, or even under a federal statute.302
.Further, no distinction would be drawn between funds disbursed under the
spending clause and other "incidental" expenditures.30 3 Rather, the taxpayer
qua taxpayer has the requisite personal stake to contest any expenditure.
Professor Davis' suggestion has even less merit than a pure private rights
model. First, it suffers from the same inherent shortcomings in rendering pub-
lic constitutional protections unenforceable. It fails to explain why statutes
can create shared grants of standing but the Constitution cannot. Further-
more, Professor Davis' proposals perpetuate the illegitimate notion that tax-
payer status can be reasonably seen as a measure of a plaintiffs personal stake.
That notion, despite both Flast and Valley Forge, should be laid to rest.
A carte blanche grant of taxpayer standing to contest expenditures does
avoid some of the major pitfalls of Flast. It would no longer be necessary, for
example, to distinguish between first amendment taxpayer cases and others.
Unfortunately, however, indiscriminate taxpayer standing is premised upon
the meritless assertion that taxpayers have money at stake when they challenge
the legality of federal expenditures. 3°4 Since there is little possibility that a
successful suit will reduce the plaintiffs tax bill, the only claim a taxpayer can
possibly assert is a right that the government spend his money in a legal fash-
ion. Once it is acknowledged that the amount of the assessment will not vary,
that interest is indistinguishable from a citizen's interest in government com-
pliance with the law-an interest Professor Davis claims is nonjusticiable.
An absence of logic is not the only flaw of a wholesale grant of taxpayer
AcnON 459-500 (1965). For further discussion of Professor Jaffe's views, see infra notes 317-28
and accompanying text.
297. Davis, supra note 252, at 617-28. See also K. DAvis, supra note 36, at § 22.02.
298. Davis, supra note 252, at 617.
299. See id. at 616-17.
300. Id. at 632.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 631-33.
303. Id. at 633.
304. See generally supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
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standing. No reasonable person would bear the burden of modem constitu-
tional litigation under the false hope that the challenge to a government
spending program might save him tax dollars. The cases discussed in this arti-
cle reveal vividly, however, that litigants will go the extra mile to assert such
deeply felt beliefs as the separation of church and state and the accountability
of government officials. Therefore, taxpayer standing teaches that plaintiffs
must be deceptive about their true motivations for bringing suit.
Professor Vining has aptly described this phenomen as standing's
"feigned personality" requirement. 30 5 The results of such word games are
troubling:
The feigned role does more than make the search for special benefi-
ciaries a useless exercise. It offends the sense of justice much as the
arcane pleading requirements of common-law civil procedure once
did. Success at law is a function of one's cleverness, not the strength
of one's complaint. It also fuels the popular sense, against which
lawyers with a concern for their personal integrity have struggled for
centuries, that law is a thing to be used and the profession a place for
persons of manipulative mind and empty heart.306
Taxpayer standing to contest expenditures assumes a personal stake, dis-
tinct from a general concern for government regularity, when none exists. It
also implies that a litigant can force the government to toe the constitutional
line when it spends money, but not otherwise. Accordingly, it should be
rejected.
B. Justice Harlan and Statutory Public Actions
The late Justice Harlan lodged a powerful dissent in Flast v. Cohen.307
His arguments not only laid bare the inconsistencies of the majority's nexus
test, but also demonstrated clearly that taxpayers are non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs
when contesting government expenditures. 30 8 Justice Harlan, however, recog-
nized that, consistent with article III, plaintiffs have been given standing as
"representatives of the public interest."30 9 The problem was to determine
under what circumstances public actions should be permitted.
The answer entails a recognition that public actions, although appropri-
ately within the purview of article III, threaten to "strain the judicial function
and press to the limit judicial authority. ' 310 To avoid an undesirable realloca-
tion of power among the three branches, citizen suits should be entertained
only after being "pertinently authorized by Congress and the President." 311
Professor Monaghan has taken a similar position, based not only on the loos-
ening of the private rights model but also upon a frank recognition of the
305. J. VINING, supra note 36, at 124-27.
306. Id. at 125-26.
307. 392 U.S. 83, 116-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
308. See id at 117-30.
309. Id. at 120.
310. .d. at 130.
311. Id. at 132.
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"special function" of the Supreme Court in constitutional review. 312
Justice Harlan's proposal carries obvious advantages. It recognizes that
the private rights theory of Marbury fails to explain much of modem article
III jurisprudence. Further, it refuses to base important jurisdictional decisions
on the fictions employed in taxpayer standing. Finally, it proposes a method
for entertaining public constitutional actions that does not raise any separation
of powers concerns. A standing rule that allows public actions only when
granted by statute, however, takes separation of powers concerns too far and
errs, though obviously on the side of caution.
Justice Harlan's proposal leaves a private rights model in place until Con-
gress chooses to act. Under its rationale, the anomaly persists that generalized
statutory rights are judicially enforceable while generalized constitutional
rights are not. Since cases recognizing the actionability of particularized con-
stitutional harm such as Bivens would not be overruled, shared constitutional
rights would remain unenforceable merely because they are shared.
Depending on Congress to create public actions also creates friction with
the theory of judicial review espoused in footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products,313 upon which much of modem constitutional law is
based. Justice Stone claimed that deference to coequal branches is inappropri-
ate when government action appears to violate a specific constitutional prohi-
bition, such as a provision of the Bill of Rights, or works to thwart the effective
operation of the political process.314 Yet even in those instances Justice
Harlan's proposal would require congressional permission to sue.
Cases such as Richardson and Reservists Committee illustrate that an-
timajoritarian interests can, by definition, hardly expect Congressional protec-
tion. Further, the establishment clause cases teach that the rights asserted in
Valley Forge are not dependent upon majority approval. 315
A standing theory that prohibits public actions unless afforded by statute
accepts both the ephemeral distinction between particularized and generalized
injury and a conflict with Carolene Products solely out of concern for separa-
tion of powers interests. No doubt, some types of citizen suits impinge upon
the separation of powers doctrine. But many, like Valley Forge, raise none at
all.3 16 Therefore, a prohibition of citizen suits absent congressional approval
is overkill in the name of separation of powers. Those issues can be treated in
a more forthright fashion under the political question doctrine.
t
312. See Monaghan, supra note 36, at 1368-92.
313. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Justice Stone set forth a number of instances in which the
"presumption of constitutionality" afforded to legislative enactments might be inappropriate. Ju-
dicial intervention was deemed to be more palatable when legislation either ran afoul of a "spe-
cific" constitutional prohibition or worked to restrict "those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about the repeal of undesirable legislation." Id
314. Id at 152.
315. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962).
316. Consider, for example, Exparte L6vitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam); and Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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C. Professor Jaffe and Citizen Suits
By far the broadest endorsement of the public action has been Professor
Jaffe's call for citizen standing.317 As the "prime political unit of the democ-
racy," 318 the citizen would be granted standing to sue local, state, or federal
officials in order to force compliance with both constitutional and statutory
dictates.319 Primarily as a means of providing "a modest measure of control
of official action," 320 Professor Jaffe argues for a pure private attorney general
or citizen-enforcer theory of standing. Under such a rationale, standing would
have been upheld in all of the cases discussed in this article.
321
Broad-based citizen standing would certainly permit the enforcement of
even generalized constitutional guarantees. Any imbalance between the en-
forceability of shared statutory and constitutional rights would be corrected
with a single stroke. Nevertheless, there are minor flaws with the proposal.
First, it seems unnecessary to alter so radically the concept of standing.
For several decades the standing doctrine has, in name at least, focused on the
interest of the party bringing suit. Legally protected rights and judicially re-
mediable injuries have supported the employment of article III powers. Pro-
fessor Jaffe's suggestion necessarily shifts the standing inquiry from an
analysis of asserted rights and injuries to the status of the plaintiff-his or her
citizenship. The courts would still determine whether plaintiffs actually seek
to assert the rights of third parties and whether the issues presented are polit-
ical in nature, but many traditional standing questions would become irrele-
vant.322 More importantly, citizen suits would become an exception to the
standing doctrine-an exception that would threaten to swallow the entire
concept.
Also, it does not appear necessary to change the law of standing to assert
statutorily created rights. The main shortcoming of a private rights model, for
both protected liberties and for the role of the judiciary, is that it leaves some
constitutional guarantees unenforceable. Congress, on the other hand, has be-
gun to assure citizen enforcement when it is important for the protection of
statutorily created interests. The private enforcement aspects of the Federal
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act,323 the Endangered Species Act,324 the
317. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459-500 (1965); Jaffe,
Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1971); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The
Ideological or Non-Hohfeldian Plaintif, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
318. L. JAFFE, supra note 317, at 486.
319. Jaffe, supra note 317, at 1044-47.
320. L. JAFFE, supra note 317, at 483.
321. Professor Jaffe would not, however, abandon all obstacles to judicial review. It is cer-
tainly possible that had standing been achieved in Richardson or Reservists Committee, for exam-
ple, the actions would have been deemed political questions. See Jaffe, supra note 317, at 1043
("To be sure, it is possible that many of the issues generated by non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs will be
political, but there will be many that are not").
322. If a plaintiff claimed, for example, that the action of a government official was contrary to
statute, it would be unnecessary for the litigant to demonstrate either injury-in-fact or that his
injury was likely to be redressed. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
323. 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (Supp. V 1981).
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
Clean Air Act,325 and the Freedom of Information Act32 6 are just a few
examples.
Even in the constitutional context, the standing doctrine has developed
within a language of protected rights, interests, and injuries. In an attempt to
cling to a rubric of private rights, the Court in cases such as Valley Forge has
excluded constitutional rights that are held in gross from the purview of pro-
tected rights. It is not necessary, however, to discard the notion of rights and
injuries in order to enforce the Constitution.
Finally, Professor Jaffe has placed a major limitation on his vision of the
public action. Such citizen suits would be entertained, at the discretion of the
Court, only "if it deems such consideration to be in the public interest. '327
This again suggests a changed focus from the rights and interests of the plain-
tiff to the needs and concerns of the public. Further, the Burger Court, by its
own example, has taught rather effectively that broad discretion under the
standing doctrine is less than desirable.
328
IV. RIGHTS AND INJURIES: CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHERWISE
Standing, as a component of article III, requires that the plaintiff demon-
strate "injury in fact, economic or otherwise. ' 329 The concept of "injury" has
been expanded over recent decades to include not only traditional common-
law notions of actionable harm,3 30 but also the infringement of economic,
331
associational, 332 environmental, 333 aesthetic, 334 and other social interests. 335
324. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. IV 1980).
325. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1976).
326. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
327. Jaffe, Standing.Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633, 635 (1971).
328. For example, the Burger Court has introduced a redressability requirement as part of the
standing doctrine through a series of decisions handed down in the mid-1970s. In its determina-
tions of whether an injury is "likely to be redressed," however, the Court has usually found the
case outside the scope of article III in poverty law cases. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614 (1973). In a decision upholding the federal subsidy for private nuclear power development,
though presenting much more substantial redressability problems, standing was granted. Duke
Power Co. v Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
Professor Bickel argued for the use of discretionary avoidance devices under the rubric of
"passive virtues." A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 111-99. Certainly, it is "intrinsically rational" for
the Court to be able to decide when to employ its own powers. Id. at 205. When the Court
chooses, however, to avoid difficult questions concerning the constitutionality of exclusionary zon-
ing by employing the standing doctrine, as it did in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), it not
only avoids a decision on the merits, but also announces new article III guidelines. Therefore,
what may be avoidance for the Supreme Court becomes a rule of decision for the federal district
courts. No doubt a federal judge sifting through Warth, Eastern Kentucky, Linda R. S., and Duke
Power has no easy task in measuring the requisites of the case or controversy requirement.
329. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp., 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
330. The "legal interest" test, predecessor to the injury-in-fact standard, embodied common
law notions of actionable harm to measure standing requirements. Accordingly, Justice Frank-
furter claimed in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath that a litigant "has standing to
challenge governmental action of a sort that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of
action cognizable by the courts." 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
331. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
332. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
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The result, of course, has been a considerable liberalization of the law of
standing.
Buoyed by apparently expanding judicial horizons, litigants have increas-
ingly presented grievances in the federal courts based upon intangible harms.
If a court could give credence to subjective concerns for a beautiful environ-
ment336 or an integrated community,337 then why should an individual be pre-
vented from litigating to effectuate a constitutionally endorsed desire for
separation of church and state? Fast,338 Richardson,339 Reservists Commit-
tee,340 and Valley Forge34 1 are all examples of cases in which the interests
asserted by the plaintiffs were created, if at all, by the Constitution itself. Fur-
ther, the "harms" to those interests were suffered, if at all, by the entire citi-
zenry, rather than just a few identifiable individuals.
In an effort to curb the burgeoning variety of interests making their way
into the federal courts, the Supreme Court has in recent years attempted to
refine its description of the injury requirement. Article III has been said to
require "distinct and palpable" injury.342 This particularized injury require-
ment has worked, for the most part, to shut the federal courthouse door to
public constitutional actions.
Citizen suits such as Reservists Committee and Valley Forge fall short of a
particularized harm standard in two ways. The injuries claimed are not "dis-
tinct" since the claimed constitutional deficiency objectively affects the plain-
tiff in the same way it affects everybody else. Nor, supposedly, are the claimed
injuries palpable or tangible, because the plaintiffs assert abstract concerns
such as the desire for constitutional compliance.
Candor suggests that article III requisites have been interpreted in this
fashion to avoid potential threats of a disproportionate allocation of powers
among the three branches of government. The problem with the law of stand-
ing that regulates the presentation of public constitutional actions, however, is
that the particularized injury requirement has been misapplied. The claim
that article III requires "distinct and palpable" harm is flatly inconsistent with
much of case or controversy jurisprudence.
It is at least a decade too late to claim that article III requires palpable
harm. Subjective concern that a wilderness area will be developed 34 3 or a
333. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669
(1973).
334. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina EnvtL. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
335. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (interracial association).
336. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
337. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
338. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
339. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
340. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
341. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
342. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Plaintiffs have also been required to assert that
their injuries "fairly can be traced" to the defendant and are "likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 28, 38, 41 (1976).
343. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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species of fish endangered 344 does not represent tangible harm. The lost bene-
fits of interracial association 345 are hardly "concrete" injuries. Further, in
cases such as Baker v. Carr3 4 6 and Norwood v. Harrison34 7 the Court essen-
tially found that some concerns for governmental regularity are actionable.
The Court's taxpayer and citizen cases, therefore, present a supreme irony
in terms of the judicial recognition of injury. The Court has repeatedly
demonstrated that some intangible injuries are sufficient to satisfy article III.
But other intangible desires, such as that for separation of church and state or
the need for governmental accountability, which are so fundamental to the
American people that they were written into the Constitution, are deemed
"abstract" and inappropriate for judicial protection.
Nor can the standing doctrine be said to require "distinct" injury. Clearly
the Flast case itself is an example of judicial recognition of widely shared
harm, but so are Baker, Norwood, and Abington.348 In environmental cases,
the Court has specifically held that the fact that a large number of people
share the "same harm" is no barrier to standing. 349 Moreover, by operating
under an injury rubric pursuant to which legislation can create enforceable
rights, the Court has had little choice but to accept extremely generalized
grants of citizen standing enacted by Congress. Therefore, the only genera-
lized rights that are not enforceable are constitutional ones. And the Constitu-
tion in article III can be said to require no more than simple, actionable injury,
not"distinct and palpable" injury.
The federal courts have recognized a variety of sources for actionable in-
jury. As Justice Frankfurter argued over thirty years ago: "A litigant ordina-
rily has standing to challenge governmental action of a sort that, if taken by a
private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the courts ....
Or standing may be based on an interest created by the Constitution or a
statute."350
The notion that the Constitution creates enforceable, affirmative rights is
hardly novel. The cases spanning the entire tenure of the Burger Court that
recognize causes of action based directly upon constitutional guarantees make
at least that much clear.35' Of course, the determination whether a constitu-
tional provision creates an implied cause of action against government officials
ultimately presents different, and tougher, questions than does the standing
344. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
345. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
346. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (voting rights).
347. 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (textbook loans to racially discriminatory schools).
348. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
349. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686
(1973).
350. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
351. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (eighth amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228 (1979) (fifth amendment); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (fourth amendment);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment).
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inquiry.352 An absolute prerequisite to a decision that a constitutional guaran-
tee creates an action for money damages against federal officials, however, is a
finding that the provision in question creates an affirmative, enforceable right.
The Court could hardly have made this requirement more clear than in Davis
v. Passman, when it noted that "[t]he equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause thus confers on the petitioners a federal constitutional right to
be free from gender discrimination . . .- 3
Similar holdings have recognized judicially protected personal rights
under the fourth 354 and eighth amendments. 355 If, as Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued in Valley Forge, there is to be no "hierarchy" 356 of constitutional rights,
the establishment clause must create a personal right to separation of church
and state. Therefore, the conclusion that the plaintiffs in Valley Forge asserted
an "injury" based upon the infringement of a constitutionally created legal
interest seems inescapable.
That conclusion, of course, was not the response of a majority of the
Court in either Richardson, Reservists Committee, or Valley Forge. When
presented with such citizen suits based directly upon the Constitution, the
Court has sensed dangers of judicial usurpation and thrown up an insur-
mountable standing barrier. The judicial response has been that the Constitu-
tion creates legally cognizable rights only when government action singles out
a plaintiff and treats him differently than "the man on the street."
The Court's denial of a right to enforce shared constitutional rights, how-
ever, should not be accomplished by the standing doctrine. In no other con-
text does the standing requirement render rights unenforceable merely
because they are common to citizens in general. Further, it is simply inconsis-
tent to contend, on the one hand, that constitutional interests are sufficiently
concrete to imply causes of action for money damages, and on the other, that
such interests are too abstract to constitute injury-in-fact for purposes of
standing.
In short, Justice Brennan's brief declaration on the actionability of gener-
alized claims, set forth in his Valley Forge dissent, outlines the manner in
which the law of standing to bring public constitutional actions can be brought
back into line with the rest of article III jurisprudence:
When the Constitution makes it clear that a particular person is to be
protected from a particular form of government action, then that per-
son has a "right" to be free of that action; when that right is in-
fringed, then there is injury, and a personal stake, within the
352. The "cause of action" cases not only involve an analysis of whether specific constitutional
provisions create enforceable rights, but also embody explicit consideration of separation of pow-
ers concerns. One of the factors the Court considers in determining whether a constitutional vio-
lation should be actionable for money damages, for example, is whether the defendants "enjoy
such independent status that judicially created remedies against them might be inappropriate."
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246 (1979).
353. 442 U.S. 228, 235 (1979).
354. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
355. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
356. 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982).
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meaning of Article III.3 -7
Rather than creating standing via a constitutional bootstrap, such a
method simply recognizes that the Constitution, like statutes and the common
law, creates affirmative, judicially enforceable rights. Further, a treatment of
public actions consistent with the Supreme Court's standing analysis in other
contexts mandates the rejection of the selectively imposed requirement of indi-
vidual injury. The result would be that certain constitutional provisions
would become enforceable by any person. It would not be inappropriate to
recall, however, that constitutional guarantees exist for the protection of every
person.
Article III standing based directly upon constitutionally created rights
would not mean that a "case or controversy" exists every time a plaintiff com-
plains of a violation of the Constitution. Rather, generalized constitutional
claims would remain subject to a variety of jurisdictional constraints. First,
public constitutional actions may often present political questions. Separation
of powers concerns have been long proclaimed to be irrelevant to the standing
inquiry.358 They should also become irrelevant in fact. When problems of
judicial usurpation are raised by public constitutional actions, those issues
should be confronted openly under the political question doctrine, rather than
covertly by declarations that the asserted injuries are too abstract to meet
standing requirements.
Second, in public actions such as Valley Forge, the standing inquiry re-
quires a threshold determination whether the constitutional provision upon
which the plaintiff relies creates an interest that has allegedly been violated by
the defendant. This means, of course, that standing analysis cannot be wholly
separated from the merits of the claim.359 The inquiry would be analogous to
the "zone of interest"360 review necessitated when standing is premised upon
statutorily created interests.36 '
Third, standing based directly upon a constitutionally created right en-
tails an examination of the intended beneficiaries of the provision in question.
357. Id at 493 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
358. See supra notes 204-18 and accompanying text.
359. Professor Albert has shown that in many instances the determination of injury cannot be
meaningfully segregated from an examination of the contours of the constitutional provision
under which relief is sought-nor should it be. See Albert, supra note 36, at 1154 ("Discussion of
these issues would be more coherent and edifying were the Court to address the sufficiency of
injury as a question pertaining to a particular claim, an interest created by the law invoked, and
not as an arching principle of standing.").
360. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
361. For example, consider Richardson v. Kennedy, 313 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd,
401 U.S. 901 (1971), in which taxpayers sought to challenge the constitutionality of a congres-
sional pay raise effectuated by the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-
206, 81 Stat. 613. The litigants claimed that the pay raise violated the article I, § 6 requirement
that "Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation. . . to be ascertained by law."
The Act was alleged to be defective because salaries were keyed to Presidential recommendations
rather than express statutory enactments. An allegation of standing based upon the legal rights
created by the article I, § 6 requirement should trigger an examination of whether the plaintiff
properly asserts interests protected by the constitutional provision. Whatever the substantive con-
tent of the compensation clause, it is not clear that the general citizenry are intended as its benefi-
ciaries. Were the Court to determine that the clause creates cognizable rights only in Senators and
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Although it is arguable that constitutional protections are designed for the
benefit of the entire citizenry, most guarantees are obviously designed primar-
ily to ensure against specific individual violations. Accordingly, a litigant
might appropriately be barred from asserting, for example, a claim that a third
party has been denied the right to a jury trial, the freedom to speak, or the
right to equal protection of the laws. Not only would general rules of third
party standing work to limit such claims,362 but also determinative would be
"the obvious principle that in cases of uniquely individual injury control of the
affair should be left to the one injured."3 63
Standing analysis, so conceived, acknowledges that constitutionally rec-
ognized rights are no less tangible and no more generalized than other inter-
ests regularly enforceable in the federal courts. Moreover, the rights presented
in such cases as Valley Forge, Richardson, and Reservists Committee,364 unlike
a variety of judicially recognized environmental and statutory interests, are
uniquely within the stated province of the federal judiciary.365 Textually
Representatives, a private plaintiff could appropriately be denied standing as beyond the "zone of
interest" created by the constitutional provision.
Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906), is a similar example. In Millard a taxpayer was
allowed to assert an article I, § 7, clause 1 requirement that revenue bills originate in the House of
Representatives. A modem court might appropriately inquire whether the origination require-
ment creates rights or interests in a citizen-plaintiff. It would also seem that Frothingham v. Mel-
lon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), is most accurately read as a determination that the due process clause of
the fifth amendment creates no legal interest in a taxpayer to be free from federal intrusion on
local matters.
362. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44
(1943). See also Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE
L.J. 599 (1962).
363. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 36, § 3531, at 228. Accordingly, it
would be unnecessary to grant standing in the examples cited by Justice Rehnquist in a footnote to
the Valley Forge opinion:
Were we to recognize standing premised upon an "injury" consisting solely of an alleged
violation of a "'personal constitutional right' to a government that does not establish
religion," 619 F.2d at 265, a principled consistency would dictate recognition of respon-
dents' standing to challenge execution of every capital sentence on the basis of a personal
right to a government that does not impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to
challenge every affirmative action program on the basis of a personal right to a govern-
ment that does not deny equal protection of the laws ....
454 U.S. at 489 n.26.
It is also worthy of note that Mrs. Frothingham actually sought to assert the federalism inter-
ests of the State of Massachusetts. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 475-77 (1923). There-
fore, her action would properly have been dismissed as a claim based upon third party rights.
364. It seems clear that the Valley Forge plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries of the rights
created by the establisnment clause. Further, standing should have been granted in the gamut of
the establishment clause cases. See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Anderson v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973); O'Hair v. Paine, 432 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1970);
Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Baird v. White, 476 F. Supp. 442 (D.C. Mass.
1979). The plaintifs in United States Y. Richardson would similarly appear to be beneficiaries of
the rights to publication of government expenditures set forth in article I, § 9, clause 7.
The Reservists Committee plaintiffs may also have been among the intended beneficiaries of
the incompatibility clause of article I, § 6, clause 2. It might have been appropriate, however, to
require that a plaintiff be among the constituents of the particular Congressmen allegedly subject
to a conflict of interest.
365. Speaking of rights set forth in the constitutional text, James Madison argued:
[I]ndependent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption
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based constitutional protections cannot be considered beyond the realm of ju-
dicial competence merely because the interests they reflect are shared by a
large number of people.
of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every en-
croachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of
rights.
I ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
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